Taiwan’s participation in global climate regime : a non-party perspective by Cheng, Fu-Lin
Cheng, Fu-Lin (2017) Taiwan’s participation in global climate regime : a non-party perspective. PhD Thesis. 
SOAS, University of London. 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/24387 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan’s Participation in Global 
Climate Regime: A Non-Party 
Perspective 
 
 
 FU-LIN CHENG  
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of MPhil 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Law 
SOAS, University of London 
  
Declaration for SOAS MPhil thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from 
the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in 
the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________  Date: _________________ 
  
Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore Taiwan's participation in the global climate regime from 
the perspective of a non-party state. It argues that given the fact that climate change is 
the common concern of humankind and that the operation of the UNFCCC regime 
will de facto or even de jure affect non-party states, the regime should refer to how a 
non-party state should be treated when the non-party state is rejected rather than 
reluctant to join the regime.  
In an effort to promote this argument, this thesis starts from the analysis that why 
Taiwan's case is unique in international law and worth studying in chapter 2. Based on 
the analysis in chapter 2, the thesis turns to explore the evolution and development of 
the global climate regime to show a whole picture and some important features of the 
regime in chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 moves to address the non-party state issue in the global climate regime. It 
first examines non-party issues based on public international law, and then analyses 
the influences of overlap of climate issues in different regimes, including the potential 
conflict of norms on climate issues inside and outside the UNFCCC system, and the 
difficulties that a non-party state will confront when integrating itself into the regime. 
Chapter 5 provides an empirical study on the making of Taiwan's laws and policies 
regarding to climate change. It elucidates how a non-party state struggles to interact 
and reconcile its domestic laws and policies with global climate regime. 
Based on the above studies, chapter 6 turns to rethink the possible approaches to 
encourage the widest participation of all countries and prevent the problem of free 
riders. Chapter 7 concludes that the UNFCCC should make itself more flexible to 
construct a more harmonised and target–oriented global climate regime.  
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 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Setting the scene 
Global warming or climate change
1
 is one of the most challenging environmental 
risks at our time. Even though some sceptics remain, its impact to the ecosystem, 
energy, human economic activities, development of technology, all livings of the 
Earth and so on has gradually been shown by scientific research. Due to its global 
nature and political sensibility, climate change has transformed from a scientific issue 
into a worldwide political issue. Basically, a global climate change regime is erected 
on the ground that problems of climate change cannot be resolved by any single 
country; instead, they should be coped with by the cooperation of all states in the 
world.  
International community has made more than two decades of efforts to establish a 
global climate regime which is feasible and acceptable by all countries. While the 
initial achievements was reached by the enactment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter the UNFCCC or the Convention) in 1994 
and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, many problems remains debatable and unresolved 
during the subsequent process of negotiations, such as the fair distribution of burden 
to reduce the carbon emissions, the effect of implementation of the developed 
countries between 2008 and 2012, and the financial mechanism to support states on 
the work of mitigation and adaptation, especially for developing countries. After years 
of negotiations, the Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC finally adopted the 
                                                 
1
 Despite that the two terms could be distinguished by following a very strict definition, ‘climate 
change’ and ‘global warming’ are interchangeable in this thesis. 
 2 
Paris Agreement in December 2015 to replace the Kyoto Protocol as a new 
international climate agreement after 2020. 
Wide participation of all countries to fight against climate change together is a key 
element to make the global climate regime work well. The Paris Agreement shall 
enter into force on the 30th day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the 
Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 % of the total global 
greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Depositary.
2
 It remains to be seen whether the double 
thresholds will be met.  
To date, states still play the main role in the rule making and implementation of 
international norms, even though the participation of non-state actors are also 
important in many aspects. The process to adopt a treaty or any legal instrument, 
whatever bilateral, regional or international, is a process of compromise of national 
interests between countries with different concerns. If states are not satisfied with the 
contents of the proposed instrument, they can choose not to sign or ratify it. The 
refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the withdrawal of Japan, 
Canada and Russia from the second period of commitment in the Kyoto Protocol are 
the just examples. In such cases, those countries are non-party states to the Kyoto 
Protocol. In addition, there is another type of non-party state, i.e. Taiwan. Taiwan is a 
non-party state in the UNFCCC regime, but its case is quite different from the 
countries mentioned above. Due to its non-member status in the United Nations, 
Taiwan is rejected rather than reluctant to join the UNFCCC regime. 
In both types of cases mentioned above, some problems arise. For example, the first 
                                                 
2
 Article 21 of the Paris Agreement. 
 3 
one is why a state becomes a non-party in the UNFCCC regime. In theory, a 
multilateral treaty should encourage as many as states to join it. They must be some 
key points which extinguish the willingness of some states to join a treaty. How can 
these obstacles be removed?  
Second, global nature, interconnectedness and multi-facet feature of climate issues 
make it nearly impossible for any country to be self-isolated from the global climate 
actions. When some countries become non-party states in the UNFCCC regime, they 
still need to govern the climate issues on other platforms. Therefore, climate issues 
are now governed by the UNFCCC regime and other bilateral, regional or 
international arrangements. The overlap and fragmentation of global climate 
governance becomes an emerging issue. The application of laws and harmonisation of 
regimes on climate issues between different treaties becomes a critical problem that is 
worth being re-examined at the time that the UNFCCC regime has stepped onto a new 
stage by the adoption of the Paris Agreement. 
1.2 The objectives of the thesis 
This thesis aims to explore Taiwan's participation in the global climate regime from a 
non-party perspective. It consists of theoretical research on non-party issue in public 
international law and empirical study on Taiwan’s peculiar case with a view to 
discussing the following research questions: 
 Why did the UNFCCC negotiations stalled? Why do some countries become 
non-party states in a multilateral treaty?  
 What is the relationship between a non-party state and the UNFCCC legal regime? 
 What is the influence of the fragmentation of global climate governance to 
non-party states in the UNFCCC regime and to global climate governance per se, 
and how can this problem be resolved? 
 4 
 What is the influence of the governance of the UNFCCC regime to the making of 
domestic climate law and policy of a non-party state? What is the implication of 
Taiwan’s case to the non-party issues in the UNFCCC regime? 
 What can be learned from the latest outcome of negotiations of the UNFCCC with 
a view to encouraging the widest participation of all states into the global climate 
regime? 
1.3 Theoretical research 
Theoretical research of this thesis starts from the question that why the climate 
negotiations were stalled and why some countries become non-party states in a 
multilateral treaty. A simple answer is that they are not satisfied with the contents of 
the treaty or they are not allowed to join it. From the academic view, this question 
could be analysed from different perspectives, such as self-interest of states, fairness, 
or the design of the regime. For example, Gupta attributes the deadlock of the climate 
negotiation and its implementation to self-interest and fairness between countries 
because firstly, the costs of measures will have to be borne locally or nationally and 
especially by certain domestic sectors while the benefits will be global, there is lack 
of domestic support in developing countries. Secondly, the industrial countries are 
reluctant to take measures on the ground that if only they take measures, developing 
countries will become free riders and their actions will make little sense because the 
emissions in developing countries are still increasing. Thirdly, in contrast, developing 
countries argues that industrial countries should take the action first due to their 
historic responsibility.
3
 
Guzman refers the failure to adopt an agreement to the ‘design of international 
                                                 
3
 Joyeeta Gupta, The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: from Conflicts to 
Consensus? 17 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). 
 5 
agreements’ generally from the perspective of economics of law. He argues that there 
is tension between two objectives pursued by states when they enter into an 
agreement. The first is the desire to make the agreement credible and binding. The 
design elements of hard law, dispute resolution, and monitoring all promote this goal. 
The second part of the explanation is related to the sanctions triggered by the violation 
of an international agreement. He argues that when agreements between states are 
violated, however, the associated sanctions do not have this zero-sum character.
4
 
Daniel Bodansky and Elliot Diringer also argue that when a multilateral treaty is on 
the way to become deeper, broader or more integrated, the loop should not be too 
ambitious because it needs time for trust to develop.
5
 The institutional development, 
the choice of legal form, precision of the contexts and so on should be taken into 
account and deserve to be examined further. The process of the UNFCCC 
negotiations provides plenty of materials on the study. More interestingly, the Paris 
Agreement takes a different approach to make the UNFCCC regime more workable, 
which is relatively new from the existing literature. Therefore, this thesis will explore 
the theoretical research based on the existing literature and bring a new insight by 
analysing the new outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations. 
The second focus of the theoretical research falls into the overlap of different 
regimes to climate issues. Climate issues now are governed by not only the UNFCCC; 
they are also addressed and need to be coped with by other arrangements, such as the 
WTO. In this regard, the term ‘global climate regime’ is used to illustrate a broader 
                                                 
4
 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’, 16 E. J. I. L. 581-582 (2005). 
5
 Daniel Bodansky and Elliot Diringer, ‘The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implication for 
Climate Change’, Prepared for Pew Center on Global Climate Change, December 2010, at 15-16, 
available at: 
http://www.c2es.org/publications/evolution-multilateral-regimes-implications-climate-change (last 
visited 4 March 2016). 
 6 
scope than the UNFCCC climate regime in this thesis. The issue of overlap has been 
discussed in a large number of literatures, especially in the fields of international trade 
and environment in general or climate change in specific,
6
 but since the Paris 
Agreement adopts the hybrid of soft law and hard law as the legal character,
7
 it seems 
that to some extent the line between a party and a non-party in the UNFCCC regime 
has been blurred more than the Kyoto period. In such a case, what is the impact of the 
fragmentation of global climate regime to non-party states of the UNFCCC and to the 
regime itself? The Paris Agreement is the important new material which needs to be 
further examined to see what has been changed so far. 
1.4 Case study: Taiwan  
As noted, Taiwan’s case is quite different from other non-party states. The way that 
international community is doing to persuade these states returning to the UNFCCC 
regime is to constantly negotiate among different countries and groups, making the 
proposed instrument acceptable to all countries. The negotiation in each and every 
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC shows how the global climate 
regime is reshaped to encourage the widest participation of all countries. In fact, they 
are entitled to join the regime and can do it as long as they agree with the contents of 
the proposed instrument. 
As to Taiwan, Taiwan’s natural environment is vulnerable when facing more and 
                                                 
6
 See for example, Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: 
Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2014); Rafael 
Leal-Arcas, Climate Change and International Trade (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013); Tracey Epps 
and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2010); Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in 
International Law, WTO Law and Legal Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2009). 
7
 See generally Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’, Review of European, 
Comparative, and International Environmental Law, Forthcoming. It could be downloaded at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735252 (last visited 10 May 2016). 
 7 
more frequent risks caused by global warming; Taiwan definitely has the need to 
cooperate with all states to fight against climate risks. On the other hand, however, 
due to its non-member status in the United Nation system, Taiwan is rejected rather 
than reluctant to join the UNFCCC regime, by which Taiwanese government is 
restrained to take part in many international affairs.  
The need of participation of all countries to combat climate change has been 
affirmed in the preamble of the UNFCCC, stating that ‘Acknowledging that the global 
nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and 
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities and their social and economic condition’. However, this common 
consensus is challengeable in the case of Taiwan’s participation. 
The UNFCCC regime has ignored its linkage to Taiwan for a long time.
8
 The 
issues of Taiwan at international level, including climate change, are usually discussed 
from the political dimension. In contrast, this thesis dedicates to Taiwan’s right of 
access to international climate regime by rethinking the global climate regime from 
the non-party perspective which has not yet been comprehensively discussed in the 
previous literature. It is expected that this thesis can draw the attention of international 
community to realizing and taking consideration to Taiwan’s struggle and efforts to 
the mitigation of global warming as a common concern of humankind. Further, by so 
doing, a broader thinking to the global climate regime which takes into account the 
elements of economy, morality, law, sustainable development and human rights in 
                                                 
88
 Michelle Winglee, ‘No Seat at the Table: Taiwan and the Global Fight Against Climate Change’, 
The Diplomat, 2 Dec. 2015, available at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/no-seat-at-the-table-taiwan-and-the-global-fight-against-climate-chang
e/ (last visited 10 May 2016). 
 8 
order to reach a balance among common concern of humankinds, equity of 
sovereignty and self-interest of states would be given in this thesis. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. It provides a brief introduction of the thesis, 
including the research background, objectives, the originality and innovation, 
selection of case study and structure in this chapter. Since this thesis chooses Taiwan’s 
case as the object for the study of non-party issues in the UNFCCC regime, it first 
explores the causes and influence of Taiwan’s non-party status in the United Nations 
system in chapter 2, in order to show why Taiwan's case is unique and different from 
other countries and worth studying. Based on the analysis in chapter 2, the thesis turns 
to explore the evolution and development of the global climate regime in chapter 3 to 
provide a whole picture and some important features of the regime.  
Chapter 4 of the thesis moves to address the non-party state issue in the global 
climate regime. It firstly examines the relationship and legal status of a non-party state 
to a treaty based on the rules in law of treaties, and then analyses the influences of not 
being able to become a party in a treaty, including the problem of free riders, potential 
conflicts of norms on climate issues inside and outside the UNFCCC system, and the 
difficulties that a non-party state will confront to integrate itself into the regime. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis provides an empirical study on the making of Taiwan's laws 
and policies regarding to climate change. It elucidates how a non-party interacts and 
reconciles its domestic laws and policies with global climate regime. 
Based on the above studies, chapter 6 turns to discuss what can be learned from the 
latest outcome of the UNFCCC negotiation and rethinks the possible approaches to 
encourage the widest participation of all countries and make the global climate regime 
 9 
work better. Chapter 7 concludes that the UNFCCC has moved onto a right way and 
should make itself more flexible to construct a more harmonised and target–oriented 
global climate regime. 
 
  
 10 
Chapter 2 The Causes and Influence of Taiwan’s Non-party 
Status in the United Nations System 
 
Taiwan is a unique case in international law and politics. As introduced in Chapter I, 
because Taiwan has not been a member of the UN and since 1971, it has been rejected 
to participate in many international organisations for a long time, especially those 
under the UN. The causes that lead to this result can be traced back to the end of the 
Second World War and mainly attribute to the unclear legal status of Taiwan, the 
Republic of China in international law.  
The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War has caused two main issues relating to the 
national position of Taiwan since World War II. The first one is who owns the 
sovereignty of Taiwan, and the second one is what the legal status of the ROC is in 
international law. Because they were not solved in the past, these two issues has 
further induced more political arguments, controversy and development, such as the 
long-lasting "One China Policy" by the PRC, "the 1992 Consensus" between the PRC 
and ROC, the call for independence of Taiwan and even the recent ice-breaking 
"Ma–Xi meeting", the first meeting of the political leaders since 1949 held on 7 
November 2015. The discussion on the legal status of Taiwan refers to not only the 
interpretation of several treaties and documents from the perspective of international 
law but also complicated international relations, in particular the Far-East policy of 
the United States during the Cold War. The controversy over the legal status of 
Taiwan is the starting point for Taiwan’s inability to become a member state in the UN, 
which has affected the making of laws and policies of Taiwanese government 
responding to international environmental affairs for several decades. 
 11 
Whatever the debate of Taiwanese legal status is evaluated, the non-member 
position in the UN has very deep influence to Taiwan when Taiwanese government 
deals with international affairs, including those in the field of international 
environmental issues. In international law, what we learn from Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaty is that "A treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent". Nonetheless, due to the 
global nature of many issues and the trend of global governance in the era of 
globalisation, Taiwan has no choice but to follow the norms made by international 
organisations in many respects. In other words, there is a gap between rights and 
obligations on Taiwan's participation in international affairs. Taiwanese government 
always seeks ways to break through the hardship in international law and politics. 
This situation is also applicable to environmental issues. In order to catch up with 
international law, Taiwan’s policy responses on climate change affairs become unique.  
This chapter firstly elucidates the debate of Taiwan’s legal status in international 
law. Then, it analyses the attitude of Taiwan toward international environmental issues 
and how Taiwan responses to the international environmental norms in generally.  
2.1 Historical background 
The Republic of China (ROC) has been established by Dr. Sun, Yet-sen and his 
Nationalist Party (also known as Kuomintang in Chinese, KMT) since 1911. At that 
time, Taiwan was still a colony of Japan because the Chinese Ching government lost 
the war against Japan and ceded Taiwan to Japan as war compensation in 1895. After 
Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, The KMT-led Chinese government sent troops 
 12 
to occupy Taiwan under the order of the commander of Allied
9
. However, Chinese 
civil war between KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exploded in 1947. 
KMT was defeated and retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and CCP established the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) at the same year. From then on, P.R.C controls most of the 
previous territory of the ROC, while KMT controls only four main islands, namely 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and several smaller islands on the Pacific Ocean. 
Both of the two governments claimed the unity of all China. In the period from 1949 
to 1971, though the question on the recognition of the opposing governments and the 
representatives of China in the United Nations went on in the international community, 
the ROC, under the bolster of the United States, was still regarded as the legitimate 
representative of China in the United Nations. Nevertheless, while more and more 
countries recognised the PRC as the representatives of China, Resolution 2758 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1971 turned to recognise the PRC as the sole 
legitimate representative of China in the UN.
10
 Though neither the PRC nor the ROC 
can de facto control the two sides of Taiwan Strait, nowadays PRC still claims that 
Taiwan is a province of the PRC while the ROC also claims that it has the sovereignty 
to the whole territory of Chinese Mainland under the Constitution of ROC on the 
other hand.
11
 Meanwhile, the status quo of the two sides of Taiwan Strait remains 
unchanged but the fact is that most of the countries recognise PRC as the 
representative of China, while only 22 States in the world establish diplomatic 
                                                 
9
 General Order No. 1 for the surrender of Japan. It was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of U.S. 
military forces and approved by President Harry Truman on 17 August 1945. 
10
 The General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution of the lawful rights of the People’s 
Republic of China in the United Nations, 26
th
 session, 25 Oct. 1971.  
11
 See also James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 198-200 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2nd ed., 2006). 
 13 
relations with ROC on Taiwan in 2016.
12
 
2.2 The legal status of Taiwan 
2.2.1 Instruments relating to the legal status of Taiwan 
Several instruments relating to the sovereign status of Taiwan should be mentioned in 
the first place. 
A. Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki is the outcome of the war between Chinese Ching government 
(Imperial China) and Japan ended in 1895. Chinese Ching government was defeated 
and agreed to cede Taiwan and Penghu to Japan as war compensation. Article 2 of the 
Treaty stated that: 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, 
together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:...(b) The 
island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said 
island of Formosa; (c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying 
between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 
23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
13
  
From then on, Japan had the legal jurisdiction to the island of Formosa (Taiwan 
Island) and the Pescadores Group (Penghu Group). 
B. Cairo Declaration, 1943 
Cairo Declaration is a statement made by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek in 
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 Diplomatic Allies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC, available at:  
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6&sms=A76B7230ADF29736. 
(Last visited on 3 March 2016) 
13
 ‘Treaty of Shimonoseki, Shimonoseki, 17 April 1895’, available at: 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm (last visited 1 March 2016). 
 14 
Cairo Conference held in Cairo, Egypt in November and December of 1943 when 
they met to discuss the progress of the war against Japan and the future of Asia. 
Regarding to the sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu, they agreed that: 
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific 
which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 
1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of 
China....
14
 
C. Potsdam Proclamation, 1945 
The Potsdam Proclamation is a statement that called for the surrender of all Japanese 
armed forces in order to end World War II, and decided how the terms of the surrender 
of Japan should be defined. On July 26, 1945, United States President Harry S. 
Truman, United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese President 
Chiang Kai-shek signed and released the document. The most important thing for the 
Potsdam Proclamation relating to Taiwan is that the Article 8 of the Potsdam 
Proclamation cited the content of the Cairo Declaration, stating that: 
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty 
shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such 
minor islands as we determine.
15
 
D. Japanese Instrument of Surrender, 1945 
The Japanese Instrument of Surrender is an agreement that formalized the surrender 
of the Empire of Japan, by which the World War II was formally ended. It was signed 
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 "Cairo Declaration, Cairo, released December 1, 1943", available at: 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html (last visited 3 
March 2016). 
15
 "Potsdam Proclamation, Potsdam, 1 August 1945", available at: 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (last visited 3 March 2016). 
 15 
by representatives from Japan, the United States of America, the Republic of China, 
the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Canada, the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic, Netherlands, and the Dominion of 
New Zealand on September 2, 1945. Regarding to the sovereignty of Taiwan and 
Penghu, the Japanese Instrument of Surrender stated that: 
We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese 
Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the 
provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of 
the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and 
subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four 
powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers, and 
We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their 
successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation in good faith, 
and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated 
representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that 
declaration.
16
 
Because this document accepted the outcome of the Potsdam Proclamation, and the 
Potsdam Proclamation also accepted the outcome of the Cairo Declaration as noted 
earlier, it seems logistic from the context of these two documents to say that Japan 
accepted the statement in the Cairo Declaration that "all the territories Japan has 
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China." 
E. Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 
The Treaty of San Francisco, also known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, was 
signed by 48 nations on September 8, 1951. It is the legal document to end the Allied 
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post-war occupation of Japan and return sovereignty to that nation; to clarify the 
compensation of Japan and other issues. In addition to this, the treaty also stirred up 
the problem of the legal status of Taiwan. According to Article 2(b) of the Treaty, 
"Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."
17
  
However, it did not specify what country Taiwan was to be surrendered. It was 
because of the Chinese Civil War which led to the controversy over which 
government was the legitimate representative of China. The play of international 
relations had a significant role during the process of negotiation. Therefore, neither 
the ROC nor the PRC were invited to attend the meeting and signed the treaty. The 
ROC recognised the Treaty of San Francisco later in the Treaty of Taipei in 1952 
while the PRC has not recognised it since then. 
F. Treaty of Taipei, 1952 
Because "China" did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, an agreement was needed 
to formalise the end of war and deal with the accompanying affairs between China 
and Japan. Under the pressure and far-east policy of the United States, it was ROC 
rather than PRC to sign Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty with Japan in April 28, 1952, also 
known as the Treaty of Taipei. Article 2 of the Treaty of Taipei recognised Article 2 of 
the Treaty of San Francisco in which "Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to 
Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratley Islands and the 
Paracel Islands." Also, Article 4 of the Treaty stated that: 
It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before 
December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a 
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consequence of the war.
18
  
However, like the Treaty of San Francisco, the Treaty of Taipei did not specify what 
country Taiwan was to be surrendered either. It left room for commentators to 
elaborate the legal status of Taiwan in a way different from those based on the 
contexts of the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument 
of Surrender. 
2.2.2 Viewpoints on the sovereignty of Taiwan 
Most of the debates on the sovereignty of Taiwan come from the interpretation of the 
above treaties and documents. Different views have been discussed since 1950s.
19
 
This thesis does not intend to give an answer to the debate itself but only to points out 
the influence of the controversy relating to the Taiwanese response of policy to 
international environmental affairs. 
Firstly, it is argued that by combining the contexts of the Cairo Declaration, the 
Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender regarding to Taiwan 
and Penghu, Japan was obliged to carry out its commitments and gave Taiwan and 
Penghu back to China. Since the Chinese KMT government unilaterally abolished the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1941 and has occupied Taiwan and Penghu under the order 
of the Allied since 1945, China has legally owned the sovereignty of Taiwan an 
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Penghu.
20
 Both the KMT-led ROC government and the CCP-led PRC government 
claim that Taiwan has become Chinese territory since 1945. If this precondition is 
accepted, the next question is which Chinese government owns it, the PRC or the 
ROC?  
On the side of the PRC, as shown in the official White Paper "The Taiwan Question 
and Reunification of China" in 1993 and the other White Paper "The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in 2000, the PRC government clearly argued that "On 
October 25, 1945, the Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu 
Archipelago, resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan."
21
 It also argued that 
because the PRC government has replaced the ROC government as the sole legitimate 
representative of China since 1971, the PRC owns the sovereignty of Taiwan 
thereby.
22
  
On the side of Taiwan, although the KMT-led ROC government was defeated in 
Chinese Civil War, it still claimed its sovereignty and jurisdiction toward "all China". 
To some extent, therefore, it could be argued that the Chinese Civil War is not actually 
over even though the ROC government de jure finished the military stand-off by the 
abolishment of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist 
Rebellion in 1991. The KMT-led ROC government has not really admitted its failure 
against PRC when "the National Unification Guidelines" in 1991(abolished in 2006 
under the reign of the Democratic Progress Party, DPP), The Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China in 1991 and the 1992 Consensus--One China 
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Principle with Respective Interpretation are considered. According to these 
instruments, "a divided China" is the most appropriate description for the stance of the 
KMT-led ROC government toward the Cross-Strait relations.
23
 For example, in the 
preamble of "The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China", it 
states that: 
To meet the requisites of the nation prior to national unification, the following 
articles of the ROC Constitution are added or amended to the ROC Constitution 
in accordance with Article 27, Paragraph 1, Item 3; and Article 174, Item 1: 
(emphasis added) 
However, because the majority of states in the world have recognised PRC 
government as the sole legitimate representative of China after 1971, the insistence of 
the KMT-led ROC government to claim the sovereignty of all China has probably 
made the Cross-Strait matters essentially within the domestic territory. As 
commentators argue, in such a circumstance, the ROC in Taiwan is seen as just a 
"government-in-exile of China".
24
 This is disadvantageous to the ROC.  
The above view is criticised by the second view that the legal status of Taiwan was 
undetermined in accordance with the contexts of the Treaty of San Francisco and the 
Treaty of Taipei. Supporters of this view argue that the Cairo Declaration and the 
Potsdam Proclamation were just policy statements between several national leaders 
during the time of war. They were not made in legal forms, not treaties and not 
ratified by the congress of the United Kingdom and the United States.
25
 Also, Japan 
is not legally bound by the two treaties because Japan did not sign them. As to the 
legal effect of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, supporters of this opinion argue 
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that the Instrument was not signed in light of the procedure of a treaty. It is just an 
agreement during the time of war in order to end the war. A peace treaty is needed to 
deal with the affairs after the war.
26
 Crawford further argues that Taiwan remained 
formally Japanese territory until the Peace Treaty because "the cession of territory at 
the end of a war must await the peace treaty". However, the Peace Treaty in 1951 left 
it undetermined because there was no agreement on which government represented 
China.
27
 The second view was also supported via some diplomatic documents from 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.
28
 Based on the rhetoric of the 
second view, it is also argued that the Peace Treaty and Treaty of Taipei left Taiwan 
terra nullius or territory subject to a condominium of the United Nations.
29
 
Therefore, some supporters of Taiwanese independence fear that the Cross-Strait 
matters would fall essentially within the domestic territory of China. They take the 
view that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined. Following this argument, at 
least two different approaches are employed to interpret the sovereign status of 
Taiwan. The first one is that since the ROC government has occupied Taiwan for 
more than 60 years, ROC owns the sovereignty of Taiwan under the principle of 
"occupation" or "prescription".
30
 The second one is that the Peace Treaty and the 
treaty of Taipei left room for Taiwanese people to determine themselves the future of 
Taiwan.
31
 The right of self-determination becomes a prevalent viewpoint in Taiwan, 
both the KMT and DPP argue that "the future of Taiwan should be determined by 23 
million Taiwanese people". 
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In my view, the second view seems more convincing subject to contexts of the treaties 
as what we learn from Article 34.1 of the VCLT. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Taipei were signed in a time both China and 
the world were facing a new and big change. In addition to Chinese Civil War, the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led to the military stand-off between the United 
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and then the Cold War had 
continued for decades of years. The United States needed partners to fight against the 
USSR together in the Far East. Therefore, even though KMT-led ROC government 
was clearly defeated by the CCP in 1949, unlike the rapid recognition of the PRC 
government by the United Kingdom in 1950, the United States still recognised 
KMT-led ROC government to be legal representative of China until 1979.
32
 
Otherwise, in light of the contexts of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation 
and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, it was clear to see that the Allied intended 
to pass the sovereignty of Taiwan to the then Chinese government, even though those 
documents were regarded as policy statements. In other words, if the outcome of the 
Chinese Civil War had been different in 1949 or the PRC had stood on the side of the 
United States at that time, the contexts of the Peace Treaty might have been written 
differently from what it is now. Therefore, it could be argued that the contexts of the 
Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Taipei that left the status of Taiwan undetermined were 
the outcome of the play of the international relations, by which the United States 
could justifiably intervene the matters between the PRC and the ROC while prevent 
from the violation of Article 2.7 the Charter of the United Nations which forbids the 
intervention of matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. From 
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this perspective, it can be argued that to some degree, the legal status of Taiwan has 
been "distorted" by the play of international relations and cannot be resolved any 
more merely by the interpretation of treaties.  
2.3 The influence of the unclear sovereign status to Taiwan 
It is no doubt that the unclear sovereign status of Taiwan has very deep influence in 
many aspects. For example, the ROC in Taiwan has swamped into an extremely 
hardship on the future of Taiwan, namely the pursuit of reunification or independence, 
and the so-called "national identity" in Taiwanese society. It also has to fight against 
the military threat from the PRC, maintain diplomatic and trade relations with other 
States, and promote its participation in the regional and international organisations.  
2.3.1 Taiwan's attitude toward the international community 
Amongst all of them, the long-standing status of Taiwan's non-membership in the 
United Nations leads to Taiwan's peculiar attitude toward the United Nations and even 
the international community as a whole. More precisely speaking, Taiwanese people, 
including the academic researchers and political parties, thought the ROC (or Taiwan) 
is not treated fairly by the international community.
33
 Of course, this attitude cannot 
be quantified but can be seen via some events. A good example was the spread of 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARs) from the PRC to Taiwan in 2003. 
Because Taiwan was not a member state in the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the PRC insisted that any measure taken by the WHO should be done through the 
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PRC, Taiwanese government could not directly obtain necessary information from the 
WHO, which increased the difficulty for Taiwan to fight against the SARs promptly.
34
  
Another good example to prove this attitude is that when the former President of 
the ROC, Chen, Shui-bian, attempted to apply for the Taiwan's accession to the 
United Nations in 2007, his letter of application to the Secretary-General, Ban, 
Ki-moon, stated that: 
The international community of today chooses to disregard the efforts of 
Taiwan's 23 million people in their pursuit of dignity and peace. It would rather 
ask a country that advocates the universal values of freedom, democracy, human 
rights, and peace to submissively remain silent when its identity is denied and 
security threatened. Whereas globalization draws nations and peoples around the 
world closer under shared interests and concerns, the United Nations has long 
excluded Taiwan from participation, erecting a wall against it and placing it in 
political apartheid. Such unfair treatment towards Taiwan is incomprehensible 
and unbearable.
35
(emphasis added) 
From a legal perspective, one of the core problems for the non-membership of the 
ROC in the United Nations is that the ROC has not explicitly claimed the statehood 
distinct from the PRC. O'Connell's view is often cited here: "a government is only 
recognised for what it claims to be."
36
 Accordingly, even we put aside the 
intervention from the PRC, it is not surprising for the United Nations to reject the 
application of the ROC to renew its membership in the United Nations. That is also 
why advocates of Taiwanese independence ask for so-called "de jure independence" 
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because they argue that is the only way to make Taiwan a normal country.
37
 
2.3.2 Taiwan's attitude toward the international environmental affairs 
Besides, Taiwan's attitude toward international environment affairs is also affected by 
Taiwan's non-membership in the United Nations system. As mentioned above, due to 
the ambiguous status under international law and the international political reality, 
Taiwan has had less interaction with international community at the 
inter-governmental level since its retreat from the United Nations. Compared to the 
progress in the application for the accession to the GATT/WTO from 1990, Taiwan's 
first contact with international environmental treaties is like a nightmare.
38
  
The "rhinoceros horn" case in 1992 was the starting point. Wen-chen Shih 
described that:  
In November 1992, a London-based NGO launched a campaign in the United 
Kingdom to boycott any product imported from Taiwan. This was because the alleged 
use of rhinoceros horn as a traditional Chinese medicine in Taiwan was in breach of 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES). The Taiwanese Government initiated various measures to crack down on the 
illicit trade and outlawed the import of rhinoceros horn. In the meantime, several 
conservationist NGOs contemplated lobbying CITES to impose trade sanctions 
against Taiwan. Subsequently, a series of interactions between Taiwan and the CITES 
Secretariat began.
39
  
Further in September 1993, a strange but deeply-influenced decision was adopted at 
the 30
th
 Standing Committee meeting of the CITES, providing that: "reports concern 
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that the measures taken by the People's Republic of China and the competent 
authorities in Taipei are not adequate to sufficiently control illegal trade in 
rhinoceros horn and tiger specimens and failed to comply with measures outlined in 
Resolution Conf. 6.10. Parties should consider implementing stricter domestic 
measures up to and including prohibition of trade in wildlife species 
now.’40(Emphasis added) The decision is obviously interesting because it seems to 
admit the jurisdiction of the PRC does not reach Taiwan at all, which is inconsistent 
with the "One China Policy" in the United Nations. In any case, no decision of trade 
sanction was made at the Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP9) of the CITES in 
November 1994. 
However, Taiwan was unilaterally sanctioned by the imposition of the Pelly 
Amendment of the US in 1994. The Pelly Amendment aimed to restrict on importation 
of fishery or wildlife products from countries which violate international fishery or 
endangered or threatened species programs. Pei-Ying Lee concludes from a historic 
review that the reasons for the United States to do so are: 1) in the late 1980s the 
conservation efforts for the elephant and the rhinoceros reached their height, and 
Taiwan was one of the key circulation routes and trade regions; 2) Taiwan's responses 
to the international community then, especially to the CITES, were weak and 
ineffective; 3) as the host country of the Assembly of States Parties of CITES, the 
United States was under pressure both at home and abroad to enforce the Pelly 
Amendment; 4) the Republic of China was not a member of the United Nations, thus 
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unable to fight for its own rights in the international arena.
41
 Taiwan's parliament was 
forced to adopt the amendment of the Wildlife Conservation Act on 29 October 1994 
in order to avoid being sanctioned. As a matter of fact, the measures taken by the 
Pelly Amendment were not authorized by the CITES. However, even if they were 
authorized by the CITES, Taiwan had no legal standing to claim its right because 
Taiwan was not a contracting party in the CITES. That is also one of the reasons why 
Taiwanese people think Taiwan is not treated fairly by the international community.  
The event of rhinoceros horn deeply influenced the attitude of Taiwan's society to 
international treaties and affected the mode of policy making at the central 
governmental level. Firstly, according to Shih's observation, it led to a thought from 
government and people in Taiwan that international environmental treaties are not 
friendly to Taiwan. Secondly, due to the improvements and success in economic 
development and international trade, it is ironically to say to some extent that Taiwan 
government always focuses on the trade advantages or disadvantages which the 
international environmental agreements will bring about to Taiwan when dealing with 
international environmental issues.
42
 Environmental problems as such are not the 
main concerns. 
In the same vein, it is fair to say that concerning the issue of global warming, the 
fear to be trade sanctioned by the international community also exists in Taiwanese 
society today. After the signature of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, an article from a popular 
and reputable magazine in Taiwan argued that "Accompanied by trade sanction, 
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green storm will brood over Taiwan."
43
 In addition, one governmental official in 
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) of Taiwan said in an interview that 
"the most serious sanction in the future is that the contracting parties are prohibited 
to trade with those who do not follow (the Protocol)…There are more than 180 
countries in the world, and 169 of them are the contracting parties, how could we do if 
Taiwan could not trade with them?" (Emphases added).
44
 Further, a senator in the 
Parliament said that "the policies, which categorize from the private fossil-based 
power plant to significant development plans, should be reviewed again. Taiwan 
should be conscious of the risk of Green 301." (Emphasis added)
45
  
Moreover, even after Taiwan has become a WTO member since 2002, this kind of 
dread still exists. Chi-Yuan Liang, a then economic researcher in Academia Sinica, 
which is the most authoritative academic research institute in Taiwan, argued in 2005 
that "though the Kyoto Protocol just entered into force this year, if Taiwan is not able 
to respond actively, some industries and products will probably be under the risk of 
being sanctioned by the EU and other advanced countries by 2012."
46
 Furthermore, 
president Ying-Jiou Ma vowed to levy energy tax in 2008, stating that "…though 
Taiwan is not a contracting party of the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan will be denied to 
trade by the international community if we do not control the volume of GHG 
emissions."
47
 (Emphasis added)  
Taiwan's fear of trade sanction by other countries even exists nowadays. In June 
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2015, Taiwanese parliament passed the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management 
Act, the most important legislation for combating climate change. The Ministry of the 
EPA of Taiwan reiterated in a number of interviews by the media that "The Act is a 
pressure to push all (Taiwanese) people reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, 
and by so doing the industries will not need to worry the trade sanctions...."
48
 
From the legal perspective, in my view, Taiwan's fear of trade sanction by other 
countries is unnecessary in the meantime, especially when Taiwan is already a 
member of the WTO now. Of course the fear was understandable in the past because 
other countries could take unilateral measures against Taiwan without considering 
their obligations in the MEAs. However, since the WTO regime has covered more 
than 90% of the international trade on goods and services, once Taiwan is unilaterally 
imposed trade-restricted measures by other countries, it can claim its own right in the 
WTO.  
Moreover, the term "trade sanction" is not appropriate because trade sanction is 
different from trade-restricted measures. Many trade-restricted environmental 
measures, for example the EU proposal to incorporate foreign aircraft operators into 
the EU-ETS, are employed for compliance of their obligations under the MEAs, or for 
the rebalance of competitiveness and avoidance of carbon leakage to other countries, 
rather than being a form of "punishment", even though they could cause similar 
economic effects in reality. However, the attitude toward international environmental 
affairs has been deeply embedded into Taiwanese society; even lawyers misuse it as 
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well.
49
  
To sum up, Taiwan's first contact with multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) was not so comfortable to its government and people. The event of 
rhinoceros horn and its subsequent development deeply affected Taiwan’s attitude 
against the other MEAs, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement. As Shih argues, this interaction makes government and people in Taiwan 
hard to exceed the appearance of 'trade sanction' to the MEAs.
50
 Government and 
some people in Taiwan ignore the environmental objective of the MEAs per se. 
2.3.3 Taiwan's strategy on the making of environmental laws and policies 
Due to the fact that on one hand Taiwan has difficulty in participating international 
affairs since its withdrawal from the United Nations and Taiwan needs to cooperate 
with other countries in order to survive itself, Taiwanese government has used several 
approaches to incorporate itself into international community.   
A. Meaningful participation approach 
The basic idea of the meaningful participation in Taiwan's diplomatic policy is that 
the ROC in Taiwan has the real need to participate in international affairs. Due to the 
current situation of Taiwan's unclear legal status, Taiwan would like to reduce the 
controversy on the problem of ideology and does not insist its official title "ROC" or 
"Taiwan" in regional or international organisations as long as Taiwan can 
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"substantially" or "meaningfully" participate in them.
51
  
The origin of the Meaningful Participation approach could be traced back to the 
late 1980s when the then President Lee, Teng-hui adopted the so-called "Practical 
Diplomacy" policy. In brief, the "Practical Diplomacy" policy aimed to show the 
international community the results of Taiwanese democratic improvement; to achieve 
diplomatic purpose by using all diplomatic resources under the principle of 
democracy; to fight against the invasion of the PRC by strengthening cooperation 
with other counties; and to assist the development of States who are friendly to 
Taiwan for the aim of world peace.
52
 Since then, Taiwanese government had made 
efforts to strengthen its bilateral relations with other countries, whatever with or 
without diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and attempted to participate in more 
international organisations, such as the United Nations, WHO and the WTO, and the 
regional fora such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
53
 or the recent 
effort to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  
Taiwan has experienced two shift of political power between KMT and DPP from 
2000 to 2015. During this period, Chen, Shui-bian's government took the so-called 
"human rights diplomacy" approach from 2000 to 2007. Chen was more aggressive 
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on Taiwan's UN campaign by the call for fundamental human rights and democracy.
54
 
Ma, Ying-jeou's government takes the so-called "viable diplomacy" from 2008 to 
present. He dedicates to mitigate the political tension and improve the cooperation of 
economy and trade between the PRC and Taiwan. Even though the KMT and DPP 
take different attitude and position toward the PRC and take different approach on the 
UN campaign, the basic idea of meaningful participation in international affairs is 
very similar to Lee, Teng-hui's practical diplomacy approach, . As Ma government 
argues: 
The point of viable diplomacy policy is to take a pragmatic approach to break 
through the impasses that have dogged Taiwan's foreign relations, and to replace 
confrontation with dialogue in a manner that respects the principles of dignity, 
autonomy, pragmatism, and flexibility.
55
 
Following the meaningful participation strategy and accompanying the trend of 
climate change issue, the UNFCCC and International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) have been targeted by Ma Government as the priority of meaningful 
participation since September 2009.
56
 
B. Voluntary compliance approach 
From the perspective of legal research, "voluntary compliance" approach may be 
more important. Although the term is not officially defined in any instrument, the 
basic idea of it is that even though Taiwan cannot participate in the United Nations 
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and its subordinate agencies, Taiwan is willing to voluntarily comply with the related 
international norms. 
There are several reasons for Taiwan to take this approach. Firstly, in the era of 
globalisation and proliferation of international organisations, Taiwan has the need to 
catch up the trend of international norms. Even though the non-membership in the 
United Nations system is disappointed, to a large degree Taiwan has no choice but to 
follow the international norms. In particular, because Taiwan's economy is highly 
dependent on the international trade, being consistent to the international norms 
become very important for Taiwanese companies for their international markets.  
Secondly, Voluntary compliance is one of the approaches for Taiwan to enforce the 
strategy of meaningful participation. by so doing, Taiwan attempts to show the 
international community that Taiwan is a responsible country and would like to bear 
the burden together with other countries to cope with global issues, such as climate 
change.
57
 
Voluntary compliance approach can be obviously proved by the incorporation of 
international laws in Taiwan. To date, at least 5 legal instruments which Taiwan is not 
a contracting party have been directly transformed into Taiwanese domestic laws, 
namely the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights announced in 
2009; the Enforcement Act of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women announced in 2011; the Implementation Act of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Act to Implement the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities both announced in 2014. All of them take the 
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same legislation model. For example, Article 1 of the Act to Implement the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that: 
This Act is made to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereafter the two Covenants), which were both adopted by the United Nations in 
1966, and to strengthen our country's human rights protection system. 
Article 2 of the Act further states that: ‘Human rights protection provisions in the two 
Covenants have domestic legal status.’  
Also to this end, the Executive Yuan of the ROC promulgated the Direction 
Governing the Incorporation of Multilateral and International Treaties and 
Agreements by the Subordinate Agencies of the Executive Yuan in 2014, by which the 
subordinate agencies of the Executive Yuan can follow to go through the process. 
In addition to the direct incorporation of international laws, Taiwan has also passed 
many domestic laws which are substantially consistent with the international norms 
concerned, especially in the field of environmental laws, even though Taiwan is not a 
contracting party in all of them. For example, Taiwan amended the Management 
Regulations for the Import and Export of Industrial Waste in 5 September 2008 in 
order to catch up the norms of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
The most obvious evidence of Taiwan's voluntary compliance approach is shown 
on the issue of climate change. Unlike the United States which explicitly refuses to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan has employed the so-called ‘voluntary compliance’ 
approach on the issue of climate change since the then President Den-Huei Lee 
claimed in written congratulations to the World Summit in 1992. It stated that: 
 34 
...Although the ROC (Taiwan) is not a party of the Montreal Protocol or the 
UNFCCC, we are willing to voluntarily comply with their norms.
58
 
(Emphasis added).  
Shih argues that due to the background at that time, the genuine intention of 
Taiwan's statements is to prevent from trade retaliation or restriction rather than the 
implementation of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.
59
  
Also, in the written statement sent by Stephen Shen, the then Minister of the 
Environmental Protection Administration to the UNFCCC Secretariat in June 2010, 
Shen vowed that Taiwan would voluntarily commit to implement its timetable and 
target of CO2 reduction.
60
 
Further, the legislation of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act is 
the best example. It was the first time submitted by the Executive Yuan of the ROC to 
the congress for consideration in 2006. The explanatory note of the draft states that: 
…Due to the special international status, R.O.C. (Taiwan) cannot sign the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol; however, being a member of the global village, 
we are willing to bear the common but differential responsibility in light of 
the Convention, in order to prevent the climate change by using cost-effective 
and lowest-cost approaches, and pursuit sustainable development. (Emphasis 
added)  
Due to the lack of support from the industrial groups, the Act had been postponed 
for consideration for almost 10 years and was finally passed on 15 June 2015 and 
entered into force on 1 July 2015. The above explanatory note is not changed in the 
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final version.
61
 Also, the Act is highly linked with the UNFCCC, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, it is fairly to say that Taiwan has taken the 
voluntary compliance approach to catch up international norms. 
Scholars in different academic fields have different views on the voluntary 
compliance approach. Yi Yuan analyses the role that international norms play in the 
cross-strait relations from the perspective of international relations and argues that 
fairness, peace means and universal values are the core elements of the international 
norms. When Taiwan voluntarily meets the expectation of international norms, 
Taiwan establishes a good communication model with the international community, 
by which the international community can trust and understand more about Taiwan 
and constantly interact with Taiwan. In other words, by so doing, Taiwan has 
adequately behaved as a "norm entity" even though Taiwan is not seen as a normal 
country. In such a case, international norms are used as a safe valve to restrict the 
imposition of sovereign will of the PRC to Taiwan.
62
  
However, some Taiwanese scholars in the field of international environmental law 
worries that Taiwan may be legally bound or commit certain obligations by its 
unilateral declaration and legislation that voluntarily comply with international norms, 
despite of its non-party status in the related international organisations or MEAs.
63
 It 
probably does not meet the best interests of Taiwan. It will more be discussed later in 
section 2.4 of this chapter.  
2.3.4 Taiwan's participation in inter-governmental organisations and agreements 
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The influence of Taiwan's vague sovereign status and non-membership in the United 
Nations are reflected in its participation of inter-governmental organisations. As 
indicated above, under the ‘meaningful participation’ approach, Taiwan shows its 
flexibility on the issues of title or the membership when attempting to incorporate into 
the international community. This could be analysed from several aspects as follows. 
A. Forms of Taiwan's membership in inter-governmental organisations 
The forms of Taiwan's membership in inter-governmental organisations or 
international treaties are divided according to the nature of the international treaty or 
organisation per se. Firstly, if they are affiliated under the UN system, Taiwan cannot 
join as a full member, but at most attends as an observer’, such as the World Health 
Assembly of the WHO. Secondly, if they are built up outside the UN system, Taiwan 
can become a full member (e.g. WTO), an observer (e.g. OECD), a cooperating 
non-member (e.g. ICCAT), a corresponding member (e.g. OMIL), a 'Fishing Entity' 
(e.g. Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna), or an associate 
member (e.g. GBIF) respectively. (See Table 2-1 to Table 2-5) Except the status of a 
full membership, Taiwan’s rights in these organisations, treaties or agreements are 
very limited.  
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Table 2-1 International Organisations in which Taiwan is a full member 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of Taiwan’s 
accession 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation 
SPRFMO 2012 
International Council for Information 
Technology in Government Administration 
ICA 2010 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission IATTC 2010 
Standards and Trade Development Facility STDF 2010 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law ACWL 2004 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission 
WCPFC 2004 
Extended Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna 
CCSBT 2002 
The International Scientific Committee for Tuna 
and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean 
ISC 2002 
World Customs Organization (Technical 
Committee on Customs Valuation) 
WCO 2002 
World Customs Organization (Technical 
committee on Rules of Origin) 
WCO 2002 
World Trade Organization WTO 2002 
The International Competition Network ICN 2002 
Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural 
Research Institutions 
APAARI 1999 
Egmont Group EG 1999 
Association of Asian Election Authorities AAEA 1998 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering APG 1997 
Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and 
Research 
SGATAR 1996 
Asia-Pacific Legal Metrology Forum APLMF 1994 
Association for Science Cooperation in Asia ASCA 1994 
International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors 
IAIS 1994 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration CABEI 1992 
International Satellite System for Search and 
Rescue 
Cospas-Sarsat 1992 
Conference of Governors of South East Asian 
Central Banks 
SEACEN 1992 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEC 1991 
International Organization of Securities 
Commissions 
IOSCO 1987 
AVRDC-The World Vegetable Centre AVRDC 1971 
Food and Fertilizer Technology Centre for the 
Asian and Pacific Region 
FFTC/ASPAC 1970 
Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization AARDO 1968 
Asian Development Bank ADB 1966 
International Cotton Advisory Committee ICAC 1963 
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Title Abbreviation 
Year of Taiwan’s 
accession 
International Seed Testing Association ISTA 1962 
Asian Productivity Organization APO 1961 
World Organisation for Animal Health OIE 1954 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/NationalOrg/OrgList/?opno=3400817f-1a5b-443c-896
9-174b5c7819b2 
 
Table2-2 International Organisations in which Taiwan is an observer 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of Taiwan’s 
Accession 
International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA 2011 
World Health Assembly of the World Health 
Organization 
WHA 2009 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Fisheries Committee) 
OECD 2006 
World Customs Organization (Revised Kyoto 
Convention Management Committee) 
WCO 2006 
Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas 
Centroamericanas 
CFAC 2005 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Steel Committee) 
OECD 2005 
Kimberley Process KP 2003 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Competition Committee) 
OECD 2002 
Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana SICA 2000 
Parlamento Centroamericano PARLACEN 1999 
Food Aid Committee FAC 1995 
International Grains Council IGC 1995 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna 
CCSBT 1994 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
EBRD 1991 
Foro de Presidentes de Poderes Legislativos de 
Centroamerica y la Cuenca del Caribe 
FOPREL 1991 
Inter-American Development Bank IDB 1991 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/NationalOrg/OrgList/?opno=6453f36a-1a1d-44ad-b91
2-40729a8d53c5# 
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Table 2-3 International Organisations in which Taiwan is a Cooperating 
Non-Member 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of 
Taiwan’s 
Accession 
International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas 
ICCAT 1972 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at:  
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/NationalOrg/OrgList/?opno=7b50c92a-bc2f-45e3-806
0-75e7e3741656 
 
Table 2-4 International Organisations in which Taiwan is a Corresponding 
Member 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of 
Taiwan’s 
Accession 
International Organization of Legal Metrology OMIL 1997 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/NationalOrg/OrgList/?opno=fb11e6ab-e95b-476e-9b3c
-685a2d353983 
 
Table 2-5 International Organisations in which Taiwan is an Associate Member 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of 
Taiwan’s 
Accession 
Global Biodiversity Information Facility GBIF 2001 
Conférence Générale des Poids et Mesures CGPM 2002 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Organizations/Organizations/Participation/?opno=4b1095c6 -3e33
-4c54-a42b-17c22c2b82c3 
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B. Taiwan's title in inter-governmental organisations and agreements 
Even though Taiwan can become a full member in a few inter-governmental 
organisations, Taiwan's title is always controversial under the "One China Policy" of 
the PRC. Taiwan is not allowed to use its formal name Republic of China or its 
well-known name "Taiwan" in all of them. Rather, "Chinese Taipei" is the title which 
can be accepted by the PRC government in most of cases. The only exception is the 
WTO. Due to its unique nature, the membership of the WTO is not limited to nations 
in the UN; rather, WTO is more flexible than the UN on the issue of accession. Article 
XII of the WTO agreement provides that: 
Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for 
in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this 
Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall 
apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
(Emphasis added) 
Taiwan, therefore, uses the title "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu" to join the WTO in 2002, although it is still called "Chinese 
Taipei" as the short title.
64
 This is called WTO model in Taiwan. To date, Taiwan uses 
the WTO model to sign any treaty with other countries which do not have diplomatic 
relation with Taiwan. 
  Another example relating to Taiwan's title in inter-governmental organisation is the 
change of Taiwan's title in the OIE in 2007. The international committee of the OIE 
adopted Resolution No. XX by majority vote in a bid to get China involved into the 
                                                 
64
 In an informal conversation between the author and one Taiwanese senior governmental official 
who took part in the process of Taiwan’s WTO accession, the official said that when Taiwan submitted 
its application for accession to GATT by the name of ‘The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu’, Professor John H. Jackson told the official that this is a very ‘skilful’ 
legal action to break the political stalemate and restriction between Taiwan and China. 
 41 
OIE in 2007.
65
 The resolution restored the exercise of the legal rights and obligations 
of the People's Republic of China within the OIE as a sovereign state member of the 
OIE, while Taiwan was compelled to change its title from ROC to Chinese Taipei and 
continued to participate in the activities of the OIE as a "non-sovereign regional 
member of the OIE".
66
 
C. Taiwan's title in bilateral treaties
67
 
Apart from the inter-governmental organisations and regional or multilateral treaties, 
Taiwan's title in bilateral treaties is very important to show how the controversy on the 
Taiwan's sovereignty affects Taiwan itself and how Taiwan breaks through the 
diplomatic hardship with other countries which do not have official ties with Taiwan. 
It could be analysed as follows. 
Firstly, Taiwan government has signed four free trade agreements with four States 
which have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In these cases, Taiwan undoubtedly 
uses ROC as the title of the signatory state. (See Table 2-6) 
 
Table2-6 FTAs between Taiwan and States having diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan 
Title Year of entry into force 
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and 
the Republic of Panama 
2004 
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and 
the Republic of Guatemala 
2006 
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Title Year of entry into force 
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and 
the Republic of Nicaragua 
2007 
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and 
the Republic of El Salvador and Republic of Honduras 
2008 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R.O.C (Taiwan), available at:  
http://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=672 
Secondly, the relationship between Taiwan and China is changing in recently years. 
On the side of the PRC, the PRC still sees Taiwan as a province of the PRC and never 
gives up the use of military action if Taiwan declares independence. However, the 
PRC government realises that it cannot get to unification just by military threats or 
diplomatic oppression, so it has turns to use peaceful approach, i.e. conferring 
economic preferential treatment to Taiwan. On the side of Taiwan, although Taiwan 
still sees Chinese government as a hostile government, Taiwan also realises the 
influence and importance of China as a world factory and market. Therefore, the 
current Taiwan government started to ease the political tension with China in order to 
get benefits in economic and diplomatic areas in 2008. The so-called Cross-Straits 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed on 29 June 2010 
based on the background (Table 2-7). What interesting here is that both Taiwan and 
Chinese entrusted two non-governmental bodies, i.e. the Straits Exchange Foundation 
and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, to sign a legally binding 
agreement for two governments. Further, no title referring to sovereignty is shown in 
the text.
68
 This case shows the peculiarity of the relationship across Taiwan Strait: 
intertwining the need of cooperation, the reality of competition, and the long-lasting 
sovereign debate and identity of nations. That is why the relationship across Taiwan 
Strait cannot be interpreted only by either international law or domestic law. 
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Table 2-7 FTAs between Taiwan and China 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of entry into 
force 
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement 
ECFA 2011 
Sources: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C.(Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.ecfa.org.tw/RelatedDoc.aspx?pid=3&cid=5 
 
Thirdly, the signature of the ECFA between Taiwan and China is regarded as a 
green light for other countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan to 
sign FTAs or other bilateral treaties with Taiwan. It is because that once China has 
signed the agreement with Taiwan, it seems to have no reason for the PRC to block 
other countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan doing the same 
thing. Due to this consideration, the signature of 'the Arrangement between the 
Association of East Asian Relations and the Interchange Association for the Mutual 
Cooperation on the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment' on 22 
September 2011 is an example. Also in this Agreement, it is hard to know who the 
signatory States are just by the title. Actually, it is an arrangement between Taiwan 
and Japan. Like ECFA, two non-governmental bodies were entrusted by their own 
governments to sign the arrangement, and no sovereign title and terms are shown in 
this context.
69
 
  Moreover, The Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation 
(ANZTEC) and another similar agreement between Taiwan and Singapore, the 
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership, was also signed after the signature of 
                                                 
69
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the ECFA. (See Table 2-8) In these two cases, however, Taiwan followed its WTO 
model and used the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and 
Matsu as the full title, and Chinese Taipei as the short name.
70
 Taiwan's WTO model 
also helps avoid Taiwan's sovereign debate, since the both countries of the agreement 
are the WTO members so they can "build on their rights and obligations under the 
World Trade Organisation"
71
, by which it is hard for China to oppose under its One 
China Policy.  
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Table 2-8 Economic cooperation agreements between Taiwan and other countries 
which do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
Title Abbreviation 
Year of 
enactment 
Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, 
and Matsu on Economic Cooperation* 
ANZTEC 2013 
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu on Economic Partnership** 
ASTEP 2014 
Arrangement between the Association of East 
Asian Relations and the Interchange Association 
for the Mutual Cooperation on the Liberalization, 
Promotion and Protection of Investment*** 
 2011 
*Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/TNE/main/home/Home.aspx 
**Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/Tse/main/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&news_id=14  
***Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/TJI/main/content/ContentLink.aspx?menu_id=3613 
To sum up, these cases are definitely a significant breakthrough to Taiwan's 
diplomatic hardship, and also show the difficulty for Taiwan to establish the 
inter-governmental cooperation with other countries. Interestingly, "Taiwan ends up 
having many different personas", as Crawford argues, "it is surprising Taiwan does 
not suffer from schizophrenia".
72
 
 
2.4 Taiwan's special concern on the application of international 
environmental law 
Taiwan is not a contracting party in many of the international organisations and 
agreements. Therefore, in the field of international environmental law, there is no 
wonder that Taiwan has special concern to consider the legal effect of the MEAs 
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toward a non-party State. The question is: in what circumstance Taiwan will be legally 
bound by a treaty in which Taiwan is not a contracting party? 
A. treaty law 
It is the principle that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent. Article 1(h) of the VCLT defines "third State" as a State not 
a party to the treaty. An example could be shown in the WTO jurisdiction. When 
dealing with the relationship between WTO laws and other international treaties, 
WTO Panel in EC - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products case (known as EC - GMO case) thought that since the United States is not a 
party of the Convention on the Biological Diversity (CBD), the CBD is not an 
applicable rule between all WTO members when Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT is 
considered.
73
  
However, the consent of a State becomes a controversial issue in the case of Taiwan. 
As indicated earlier, Taiwan employs voluntary compliance approach to catch up 
many international environmental norms of the MEAs. Does the unilateral declaration 
mean that Taiwan has agreed to be bound by the MEAs?  
Shih cited the Nuclear Test case in the International court of Justice (ICJ) as her 
arguments. In this case, France had operated several nuclear tests near New Zealand 
since 1966. New Zealand filed the suit to the ICJ in 1973 and 1974 respectively, 
asking to terminate French acts by the order of the ICJ. From July to October 1974, 
French government unilaterally announced for six times that it will terminate the test 
in 1975 by the minister of National Defense, president and minister of Foreign Affairs 
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respectively. The case was finally settled under the ground that France terminated the 
nuclear test in 1975.
74
 As to the legal effect of declarations made by unilateral acts of 
a State, the ICJ held that: 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning 
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. 
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the 
intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound 
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a 
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course 
of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given 
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the 
context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing 
in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, 
nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration 
to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly 
unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State 
was made."
75
  
According to this paragraph, the "publicity of the declaration" and the "intent to be 
bound" becomes two key elements in judging the legal status of unilateral acts of a 
State.  
Moreover, International Law Commission (ILC) has also discussed the matter since 
1996 and submitted a report (Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations 
of States capable of creating legal obligations) to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 2006.
76
 Ten guiding principles were made in the report. Basically ILC also 
agree that "Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have 
the effect of creating legal obligations. When the conditions for this are met, the 
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binding character of such declarations is based on good faith; States concerned may 
then take them into consideration and rely on them; such States are entitled to require 
that such obligations be respected."
77
 However, the condition should be strict. The 
ILC also states that "to determine the legal effects of such declarations, it is necessary 
to take account of their content, of all the factual circumstances in which they were 
made, and of the reactions to which they gave rise."
78
  
The ICJ judgment and the opinions of the ILC are important reference on this 
matter, even though the ICJ did not clearly elucidate the legal effect of unilateral acts 
and the opinions of the ILC cannot undoubtedly be seen as a source of international 
law. In such a circumstance, the unilateral declaration and wordings in certain 
Taiwanese laws vowing to voluntarily comply with international norms may create 
certain legal obligations to Taiwan because the elements of it have been met.
79
 If this 
is the case, the cost of voluntary observance could be very high because Taiwan has to 
fulfil its treaty obligations without simultaneously having the opportunity of 
participating in the negotiation and rule-making process and enjoys the rights 
bestowed by the treaty.
80
  
B. The possibility of co-existence of a treaty and a customary law 
A treaty is different from a customary international law. However, in some special 
circumstance, a rule set forth in a treaty may be binging to a third State as a customary 
rule of international law. Article 38 of the VCLT states that:  
Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
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binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as 
such. 
The relationship between treaty and customs is close, as Philippe Sands argues, "a 
treaty might codify or further develop a rule of customary law" or alternatively "the 
conclusion and implementation of a treaty may reflect the existence of a rule of 
customary law.
81
 Moreover, as the International Court of Justice recognised in the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, customary rules may emerge which are 
identical to those of treaty law, and which exist simultaneously with treaty 
obligations.
82
 In addition, Article 102(3) of Restatement of the Law (third), Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, also provides that: "International agreements 
create law for States parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary 
international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states 
generally and in fact widely accepted." In the Jurisdiction of the ICJ, Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration is one of the examples to be regarded as a customary 
law.
83
 
In the case of climate change, although it is too early to conclude, the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities articulated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC 
seems to have the potential to become a customary law in the future. Therefore, in 
such a case, even though Taiwan is not a contracting party in a certain MEA, if a rule 
in the MEA meets the elements so that it is regarded also as a rule of customary law, 
Taiwan will likely be bound by the rule. This is not the outcome that Taiwan wants. 
The same logic can be applied to the issue of "erga omnes" obligations. It refers to 
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legal obligations which is owed to the whole international community of states and 
can be enforced by or on behalf of that community.
84
 Some people attempted to usher 
the erga omnes obligations from human rights into the field of international 
environmental law. For example, the Draft to the Convent on Environment and 
Development (1995) which was made by the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) states that: 
The concept of ‘common concern’ is not new and has been applied in other fields. 
It forms the basis for international laws relating to human rights, humanitarian relief 
and international labour relations. Those obligations are now recognised as 
obligations erga omnes, owed by all States to the entire international community.
85
 
The dissenting judgement of Judge Weeramantry in the Gabčíkovo – Nagymaros 
Case also regards sustainable development as an erga omnes obligation.
86
 However, 
as Birnie et al. argues, if this kind of arguments is correct, the real characteristic is " 
not that all states have standing before the ICJ in the event of breach, but that the 
international community can hold individual states accountable for compliance with 
their obligations through institutions such as the Conference of the Parties to the 
Climate Change Convention or other comparable bodies endowed, whether by treaty 
or General Assembly resolution, with supervisory power."
87
 In such a case, Taiwan 
will again has no opportunity to participate in the process of rule making or 
negotiation.  
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2.5 Summary of the chapter 
Taiwan is a unique case in international law and politics. Taiwan's unclear sovereign 
status in international law intertwined with controversial self-position of the ROC and 
complicated operation of international politics lead to Taiwan's non-membership in 
the United Nations and its subordinate agencies. Due to the non-membership, Taiwan 
has very limited access to participate in the negotiation or rule-making process of 
international affairs. However, Taiwan cannot survive alone without the connection 
with international community in the era of globalisation, especially in the field of 
international trade. Accordingly, Taiwan develops a peculiar model to incorporate into 
international community. 
In the field of international environmental law, Taiwan's first contact with the 
MEAs in the early 1990s was a nightmare. Nowadays, Taiwan has made efforts to 
voluntarily comply with international environmental norms. Inter alia, Taiwanese 
government has paid much attention to the development of international climate 
change regime for two decades. Conference of the Parties (COP) in the UNFCCC has 
adopted the Paris Agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2020. On the other 
hand, Taiwan has also renewed its national legislation on climate change in recently 
years. The following chapters will focus on how Taiwan interacts with international 
climate change regime from the perspective of a non-party State. 
  
 52 
Chapter 3 Development of International Climate Change 
Regime 
 
The international climate change regime is constructed through the process of 
normalisation. Briefly speaking, it start from the scientific discovery and research on 
the climate change phenomenon. When more and more people recognise the existence, 
impacts and influence of the problem to human beings or ecosystem from the 
scientific discovery, climate change gradually become an issue at the national, 
bilateral, regional or international level. At the international level, the problem is 
discussed through the negotiation of States in order to see if any consensus can be 
reached. Once the consensus is reached, negotiators set up a framework convention as 
the fundamental legal basis and then craft protocols to implement the subsequent 
work. In other words, scientific research, political negotiation and rule making 
constitute the integral parts of the international climate change regime.
88
  
Accordingly, this chapter firstly explores the scientific discovery to show the 
background information of the climate change issue. It then analyses the development 
of international climate change regime by scrutinizing the process of negotiations. 
Some critical issues will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.   
3.1 Scientific discovery of Climate Change 
The scientific research on climate change could be traced back to 1896.
89
 However, it 
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was not until 1988 that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), with a view to providing scientific views on the 
current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts.
90
  
A. Change of climate system 
Although the scientific debate on the existence of global warming and its casual 
linkage with artificial GHG emissions still continues in the mean time,
91
 the IPCC 
has published five assessment reports since 1990 and has taken more and more 
positive position on it. Firstly, the Working Group I of the IPCC published its 
assessment report of the physical science basis of climate change as a part of the Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) in 2013. According to the report, the IPCC observed that 
warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and 
ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, 
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and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.'
92
  
More specifically speaking, as to atmosphere, the globally averaged combined land 
and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 
0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] °C, over the period 1880 to 2012, when multiple independently 
produced datasets exist.
93
  
As to ocean, on a global scale, the ocean warming is largest near the surface, and 
the upper 75 m warmed by 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade over the period 1971 to 
2010.
94
 
As to sea level, the rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger 
than the mean rate during the previous two millennia (high confidence). Over the 
period 1901 to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m.
95
 
As to the emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon dioxide concentrations have 
increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and 
secondarily from net land use change emissions.’96 
Secondly, the AR5 analyses the drivers of climate change. It attributes the drivers to 
"natural and anthropogenic substances and processes that alter the Earth’s energy 
budget, i.e. radiative forcing (RF)." The AR5 further concludes that "total radiative 
forcing is positive, and has led to an uptake of energy by the climate system. The 
largest contribution to total radiative forcing is caused by the increase in the 
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atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1750."
97
 
Thirdly, AR5 attributes the climate change of the earth to human influence with 
more evidences found since AR4 in 2007. AR5 argues that "it is extremely likely that 
more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 
1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together."
98
 
Finally, the Working Group I made a pessimistic prediction on the future global and 
regional climate change, arguing that if the emissions of greenhouse gases continue, it 
will lead to further warming and changes in all components of the climate system
99
, 
including atmosphere, water cycle, air quality, ocean, cryosphere, sea level, and 
carbon and other biogeochemical cycles.
100
 The effect of emissions of greenhouse 
gases is cumulative and will persist for many centuries. Therefore, part I of the AR5 
concludes that "limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained 
reductions of greenhouse gases emissions."
101
 
B. Impacts, vulnerability and adaptation of climate change 
The Working Group II of the IPCC published its assessment report as the second part 
of the AR5 in March 2014.
102
 As shown in the contents of the Summary for 
Policymakers, It considers the observed impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation of 
climate change. Notably, the Group II adds a new focus on risk which did not exist in 
the AR4. It supports people and societies to know or rank the risks and opportunities 
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for adaptation and how to manage future risks.
103
 
The global climate has largely changed, and changes of climate system have great 
impacts on natural and human environment, assessed by the AR5. The impacts on 
natural system are strongest and most comprehensive, while impacts on human 
systems have also been attributed to climate change, with a major or minor 
contribution of climate change distinguishable from other influences.
104
 Impacts from 
recent extreme weather events, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and 
wildfires, also show vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human 
systems to current climate variability.
105
 Key risks are elaborated, spanning sectors 
and regions, such as freshwater resources, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, 
coastal systems and low-lying areas, marine systems, food security and food 
production systems, urban and rural areas, human health, human security, economics, 
livelihoods and poverty. They are all affected at different levels by climate change.
106
  
C. Sub-conclusion  
As noted earlier, the sceptics toward the existence of changes of climate system and 
causation with human greenhouse gases emissions still exist so far, and the levels of 
uncertainty of climate risks vary from different sectors and countries. However, when 
the extreme weather events appear more and more often in recent years, even though 
the uncertainty of risk is the characteristics of climate problem, it would be better to 
manage the risk earlier under the concept of precautionary principle. In any case, the 
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AR5 of the IPCC provides a scientific basis for negotiators to consider how to manage 
the risks of natural and human systems relating to climate change.  
3.2 Development of the UNFCCC regime  
The international political response to the scientific concern of climate change did not 
exist until the signature of the UNFCCC in 1992. The publication of the First 
Assessment Report of the IPCC in 1990 provided a scientific support for the making 
of political decisions. In response to it, the UN General Assembly 'decides to establish 
a single intergovernmental negotiating process…for the preparation by an 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee of an effective framework convention on 
climate change, containing appropriate commitments…'107 However, the conflicts of 
interests between developed and developing countries played a major part during the 
negotiation process.
108
 It is a prolonged process to establish the regime. Some 
moments and events of the negotiations are particularly important. 
(1)The UNFCCC 
After the AP1 of the IPCC was released in 1990, the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) was set up by the UN General Assembly in February 1991 to 
negotiate a new global climate treaty. The UNFCCC was opened for signature along 
with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1992. It entered 
into force on 21 March 1994 and has 196 Parties now.
109
 The UNFCCC is a 
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milestone for the crafting of a global climate regime. Firstly, it employs the 
framework convention/protocol model, by which the UNFCCC allows work to 
proceed in an incremental manner; and it can produce positive feedback loops, 
making the adoption of specific substantial commitments more likely.
110
 Secondly, 
though the Convention failed to determine concrete target and timetable of the 
reduction of GHG emissions, Article 2 of the Convention stipulates the ultimate 
objective of this Convention is "to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system", and the Annex I Parties commit 
to return individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of GHG emissions.
111
 To this end, 
four principles were incorporated into the Convention, namely the CBDR principle; 
full consideration to the specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties; precautionary principle and sustainable development.
112
 They are 
important materials to interpret and shape the international climate change regime. 
Thirdly, the action for mitigation, adaptation, compliance mechanism and support 
mechanism are seen as the four pillars of the UNFCCC.
113
   
(2) The Berlin Madate 
As a framework, however, as Bodansky argued quite early in 1993, the UNFCCC was 
a disappointment to many.
114
 It contains no concrete commitments on the reduction 
of greenhouse gases; it fails to include establish the financial and technology 
clearinghouse or insurance fund; it lacks of market mechanism; and it confers 
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over-loose requirements to developing states and fossil-fuel producing countries.
115
 
In any case, the UNFCCC needs to be polished, supplemented and implemented by 
subsequent work of the Conference of the Parties (COP). Therefore, the Berlin 
Mandate was adopted on COP1 of the Convention in 1995 for ‘the strengthening of 
the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention…through the 
adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument’116  
(3) The Kyoto Protocol 
The release of the Second Assessment Report (AR2) of the IPCC in 1995 helped to 
strengthen the political wills of negotiators on further international climate change 
negotiations. In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP3. The 
Kyoto Protocol responded many of the previous critics toward the UNFCCC. For 
example, the Parties agree to cut their overall emissions of greenhouse gases by at 
least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012;
117
 three flexible 
mechanisms, joint implementation (JI)
118
, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)
119
 and emissions trading system (ET) are entrenched to assist Annex I states 
meeting their national targets in a cost-effective way;
120
 and the CBDR principle is 
maintained in the Kyoto Protocol.
121
 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 
February 2005 after the accession of Russia, and has 192 Parties to date.
122
 However, 
The United States still refuses to join the Kyoto Protocol so far. 
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(4)The Marrakesh Accords 
In 2001, the IPCC's Third Assessment Report was released and the Marrakesh 
Accords was also adopted at COP7 in the same year. The Marrakesh Accords 
establishes many rules for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol such as capacity 
building and transfer of technology. It also establishes three new funds, namely the 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) 
under the Convention,
123
 and the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol.
124
 
(5) The Montreal Conference 
In 2005, following the enter into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the COP11 of the 
Convention and the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP1) took place in Montreal, Canada. Among all the 
important achievements made in COP/MOP1, the establishment of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP) and the discussion on possible post-2012 commitments are 
probably the most crucial for the future of this regime. COP11 initiated a ‘dialogue’ to 
exchange the experience and analyse the strategies for the long-term cooperation 
action to address climate change.
125
  
(6) The Bali Roadmap 
The work of AWG-KP and the Dialogue under the Convention between 2006 and 
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2007 made a series of decisions which comprised the Bali Roadmap in COP13 in 
2007. Notably, the discussion was deeply influenced by the release of the IPCC’s 
fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007. The AWG-KP recognised that 'the 
contribution of Working Group III to the AR4 indicates that global emissions of 
greenhouse gases need to peak in the next 10 to 15 years and be reduced to very low 
levels, well below half of levels in 2000 by the middle of the twenty-first century in 
order to stabilize their concentrations in the atmosphere at the lowest levels assessed 
by the IPCC to date in its scenarios.'
126
 The so-called lowest level scenario of the 
IPCC here is that if we want the atmosphere to be stabilised at 450 ppm CO2-eqb, the 
targets of emissions allowances for various GHG concentrations for Annex I countries 
should be 25 to 40 per cents below the level in 1990 by 2020, and 80 to 95 per cents 
below the level in 1990 by 2050.
127
 This decision of the AWG-KP played the vital 
role on the conclusion of the Doha Amendment in 2012. Moreover, in Bali Action 
Plan, the Parties determined to "launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, 
effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through outcome and adopt 
it at COP15."
128
 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was established under the Convention with a view 
to conducting the negotiation. 
(7) The Copenhagen Accords 
Since COP15 was expected to reach an agreement on the post-Kyoto commitments of 
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GHG reductions, it drew worldwide attentions during the conference in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, ranging from media to the public. However, as the UNFCCC itself 
admitted afterwards, the Bali Action Plan was too ambitious and optimistic, and 
"underestimated the complexity both of climate change as a problem and of crafting a 
global response to it."
129
 The high expectation ended up with deep frustration due to 
the disagreement of positions from different groups of states on the burden sharing of 
addressing climate change. The non-binding Copenhagen Accord was made in COP15, 
containing no concrete reduction commitments except that Annex 1 Parties committed 
to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-wide emissions targets 
for 2020 and submit it to the Secretariat by 31 January 2010, while Non-Annex 1 
Parties agreed to submit their mitigation actions by the same day.
130
 Despite of this, 
there was achievement in the COP15. Developed countries pledged to provide the 
so-called "fast-start finance". It is new and additional resources, including forestry 
and investments, and approaches USD 30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012. 
(8) The Cancun Conference 
COP16, held in Cancun in 2010, seemed to revive the negotiation from the frustration 
of the Copenhagen Conference. Although the Parties of the Convention did not reach 
an agreement on the GHG reduction commitment after 2012, the Cancun Agreements 
was adopted in which the Parties shared a vision for long-term cooperative action and 
agreed a comprehensive package of future work, including mitigation, adaptation, 
finance, technology transfer, and capacity building to developing countries. In 
particular, the Parties decided to establish a "Green Climate Fund", which is to be 
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designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention, to 
‘support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country 
Parties using thematic funding window’.131  
(9) The Durban Conference 
Given the fact that the negotiation on the mitigation commitment has been deadlocked 
for several years, COP17 held in Durban in 2011 seemed to become a turning point to 
it. The Parties determined to launch a new platform of negotiations, i.e. the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to take on the 
subsequent work of the AWG-LCA of the Convention from the first half of 2012. The 
ADP was required to "complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in 
order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come 
into effect and be implemented from 2020."
132
 In addition, as to the long-term finance, 
developed Parties provided the fast-start finance as a new and additional resources 
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012. They also committed to a goal 
of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries.
133
 
(10) The Doha Conference 
Recognising the coming expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in the end of 2012, the Parties 
of the Kyoto Protocol in COP/MOP8 agreed to set up a second commitment period of 
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the Kyoto Protocol, namely 2013 to 2020, to continue the ultimate goal of the 
Convention.
134
 In addition, while most Annex 1 countries have made their new 
reduction commitments for the second commitment period, Canada decided to 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol; Japan, Russia and New Zealand declared that they 
do not have the intention to be bound in the second commitment period by different 
reasons.
135
 Further, since the Doha Amendment is an amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, a total of 144 instruments of acceptance are required for the entry into force 
of the amendment, subject to Article 20.4 of the Kyoto Protocol.
136
 
(11) The Warsaw Conference 
Under the expectation to reach a new agreement with legal force by 2015, the meeting 
of COP19 held in Warsaw in 2013 was seen as a middle point to COP20. The AR5 of 
the IPCC released in September 2013 further confirmed the risk and impact of global 
climate change but the negotiation was still deadlocked. At that time, given the 
current fact that the United States still refused to join the Kyoto Protocol and some 
big emitting countries, whatever developing or developed ones, were reluctant to 
make commitments on the second period of the Kyoto Protocol, the destiny of COP20 
and the future of the Kyoto Protocol were regarded optimistic. However, the existing 
Durban Platform and the Green Climate Fund were still running; the Warsaw 
Framework for REDD Plus and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
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Damage and other decisions were adopted therein.
137
 It seemed not in the worst 
situation. 
(12) The Lima Conference 
The Lima Conference was held on 1-12 December 2014. It began with a sense of 
momentum, following nearly $10 billion in pledges to the new Green Climate Fund 
and the joint announcement by the United States and China of their post-2020 
emission targets. What the more important contribution of the conference to the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement later in 2015 was the initiative of the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the meeting quickly bogged 
down, and parties put aside the "elements" document to haggle over the more 
immediate issues of how their intended contributions to the Paris agreement are to be 
submitted to and weighed by the UNFCCC.
138
 
(13) The Paris Conference 
At COP 21 in Paris, Parties to the UNFCCC reached a historic agreement to combat 
climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for 
a sustainable low carbon future.
139
 Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement set up its 
ultimate goal to keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, the agreement requires all 
Parties to make their best efforts through “nationally determined contributions” 
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(NDCs) and present a progress over time.
140
 As noted in chapter 1, the Paris 
Agreement will enter into force once the double threshold is met and the deposition 
procedure is completed.   
3.3 Key provisions of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol  
The UNFCCC regime adopted the ‘framework-protocol’ model to make it flexible to 
the future development of the regime. They commonly set up a number of rules, 
including the decisions made by the COP/MOP and the subordinate bodies. 
Provisions can be roughly categorized into several parts: a preamble for introduction; 
a set of principles which constitute theoretical basis and main approaches to the 
objectives; objectives and commitments; secretariat and subsidiary bodies which 
operate the regime; financial mechanisms with the commitment by some developed 
country parties, capacity building and transfer of technology; implementation, 
compliance and dispute mechanism; and the final provisions relating to entry into 
force, amendments, depository etc. The thesis will discuss some main provisions in 
this section. 
 Objectives 
The UNFCCC is set up by country parties to avoid the risks of human-made climate 
change. The ultimate objective is stipulated in Article 2: ‘…stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The level ‘should be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
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economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’ However, this article has 
been controversial since it was made. First, due to its declarative language used in the 
final context, it is hard to be seen as a concrete commitment or obligation.
141
 Further, 
the unclear definition of ‘dangerous’ is also mentioned by scholar.142 However, 
following the release of the AR4 of the IPCC in 2007, the Parties have accepted the 
research of the report and agreed to hold the increase in global average temperature 
below 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.
143
 The debate is solved in a large 
extent. As Sands argues, the following task of adaptation, especially for vulnerable 
countries, has been more prioritized.
144
  
The Kyoto Protocol shares the objective of the Convention but goes further. The 
Kyoto Protocol requires rich countries to reduce their GHG emissions below levels 
which are based on the emission volume in 1990. Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol 
provides that: ‘The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure 
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated 
pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed 
in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to 
reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels 
in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.’ The major distinction between the two is 
that the Convention just urges developed countries to stabilize GHG emissions, while 
the concrete emission reduction targets which developed countries bear are legally 
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binding commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 Principles 
Article 3 of the Convention set out some ‘Principles’ in order to guide the Parties 
achieve the objectives. However, it raises debates as well in the first place. The U.S. 
questioned the unclear legal status of these principles. From the perspective of 
application of law, if the contexts of the provision are not tangible or specific enough, 
such as principles, it is problematic for judges to apply them to the judicial cases. 
However, as Bodansky argues, principles embody certain standards even though these 
standards are more general than commitments.
 145
 Since the principles are set to 
achieve the objective of the Convention, they should be taken into account by parties 
in good faith. Several principles are discussed as follows. 
1. Fairness 
Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC states that:  
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC shows two concepts, i.e. inter-generational justice and the 
CBDR principle. Both of them are the expression of fairness. The CBDR principle 
constitutes the foundation of the international climate change regime. It establishes a 
clear structure that treats the unlike unlikely. Developed countries have definitely 
emitted most of the GHGs contributing to global warming. Following the CBDR 
principle, the developed countries should take the lead to combat climate change and 
the adverse effects. Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol reiterates to take into account the 
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CBDR principle when all Parties implement their commitments. Interestingly, as 
Bodansky argues, in the process of negotiation of the Convention, although the 
developed and developing countries both agreed that developed countries should take 
the lead, the reasons varied. Developed countries argued that it is because they have 
more final and technological capacities to do so, not because they bear the main 
responsibilities for the climate problems.
146
 The negotiating history shows again the 
rooted conflict of interests between the North and South. However, by setting up 
differentiated responsibilities to different countries, the incorporation of the CBDR 
principle is the key element which integrates the developing countries into the 
international climate change regime. More detail will be discussed in the next section. 
2. Special needs of developing countries 
Article 3.2 of the UNFCCC stipulates that: 
The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would 
have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, 
should be given full consideration.  
This is definitely the expression of differential treatment. As the AR4 of the IPCC 
have shown, developing countries are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change and have less capacity to respond. However, the GHG emissions from 
developing countries have increased dramatically due to the rapid increase of 
economic growth in recent decade. Data from International Energy Agency (IEA) 
shows that the gap of CO2 emissions between OECD and non-OECD countries has 
reduced gradually from 1990 to 2011.
147
 Therefore, the special needs of developing 
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countries are changing and need to be reviewed over time. 
3. Precautionary principle 
Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC states that ‘…Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures….’ This principle aims to solve the burden of proof 
because many environmental problems tend to have irreversible damage to 
environment but is hard to prove. However, when the precautionary principle is 
applied, it takes reference to cost-effectiveness, stating that the parties should ‘take 
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.’ 
In the Kyoto Protocol, the precautionary principle is not literally mentioned, while 
the cost-effectiveness is stated in Article 10.1(a), saying that:  
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances,…shall formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, 
cost-effective national and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve 
the quality of local emission factors, activity data and/or models….’ 
The idea of cost-effectiveness seems to be released from precautionary principle 
and becomes an independent, cost-benefits guidance to the implementation of the 
Protocol. The flexibility mechanism embodied in the Protocol and the new proposals 
in recent negotiations, such as the ‘new market-based mechanism’,148 can be an 
example. In any case, even though the parties just need to ‘take into account’ the 
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cost-effective approach rather than bear a legal obligation, the approach implies the 
cooperation between countries because it is usually more cost-effective in a 
multilateral or global level.
149
 By so doing, it helps to solid the international 
community in an era of interdependence.     
4. Sustainable development  
Article 3.4 of the UNFCCC clearly states that ‘The Parties have a right to, and should, 
promote sustainable development....’ The principles of sustainable development 
pursue the balance between economic development, social development and 
environmental protection. As this article goes on, climate policies and measures 
should ‘be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be 
integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic 
development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.’ Article 2.1 
of the Kyoto Protocol also resonate this principle. It requires the Annex I countries to 
take measures for implementation ‘in order to promote sustainable development’. 
Further, economic development and environmental protection are in conflicts with 
each other in some cases. The Tuna/Shrimp case of the GATT is the example. Article 
3.5 of the Convention states that ‘Measures taken to combat climate change, including 
unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.’ Article 2.3 of the 
Kyoto Protocol follows and states that: he Parties included in Annex I shall strive to 
implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize 
adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on 
international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other 
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Parties…’ In international economic law, Article XX of the GATT has similar 
statement. They both aim to harmonize and prevent the potential conflicts between 
international trade system and the MEAs. In addition, as noted in previous chapter, 
Brundtland Report has defined sustainable development in a temporal dimension. 
Therefore, the inter-generational equity stipulated in Article 3.1 of the Convention 
should also be categorized in here as well. 
 Flexibility mechanism 
Flexibility mechanism is an innovative experiment in the international climate change 
regime. It is the expression of cost-effectiveness or market-oriented approach. It 
includes Joint Implementation, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). They are analysed as follows: 
Joint Implementation (JI) 
The basic principles are defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It says that ‘For 
the purpose of meeting its commitments …, any Party included in Annex I may 
transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting 
from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing 
anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy’, 
provided that requirements from (a) to (d) are fulfilled. This is the international 
cooperation made by two or more Annex I countries, and both public and private legal 
entities could be involved in JI projects according to the subparagraph 3 of this Article. 
Notably, the use of JI should be a supplementary rather than a main approach to 
achieve the goal of GHG emission. 
CDM  
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The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. It provides for Annex I 
Parties to implement project activities that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, 
in return for certified emission reductions (CERs). The CERs generated by such 
project activities can be used by Annex I Parties to help meet their emissions targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Article 12.2 stresses that such project activities are to assist 
the developing host Parties in achieving sustainable development and in contributing 
to the ultimate objective of the Convention. In other words, this is a win-win approach 
for both developed and developing countries. Notably, reductions in emissions should 
be ‘additional’ to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity, 
in accordance with Article 12.5(c).   
Emissions Trading (ET) 
Emissions Trading provides for Annex I Parties to acquire units from other Annex I 
Parties and use them towards meeting their emissions targets the Kyoto Protocol. This 
enables Parties to make use of lower-cost opportunities to reduce emissions. 
According to Article 17, of only Annex I Parties to the Convention with emission 
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B to the Protocol may 
participate in such trading. 
Flexibility mechanism is supplemented by the Marrakesh Accords in 2002. In 
general, it states that ‘the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic 
action and that domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort 
made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.’150 The eligibility to participate 
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in the mechanisms by a Party included in Annex I shall be ‘dependent on its 
compliance with methodological and reporting requirements under Article 5, 
paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Kyoto Protocol.’151 Also, 
certified emission reductions (CERs), emission reduction units (ERUs) and assigned 
amount units (AAUs) as well as removal units resulting from activities under Article 3, 
paragraphs 3 and 4, ‘may be used to meet commitments under Article 3.1, paragraph 
1.’152 
Further, the market-oriented characteristics of the flexibility mechanism make it 
significant and popular, since it tackles environmental problems with economic 
development more closely and directly. However, the Parties are still seeking more 
approaches to achieve their mitigation task. For example, a so-called ‘new 
market-based mechanism’ (NMM) is proposed in COP17. COP17 urges the Parties to 
‘define a new market-based mechanism, operating under the guidance and authority 
of the Conference of the Parties, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, 
mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and 
developing countries…153 The future of NMM remains to be seen. 
 Compliance Mechanism 
Compliance Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is one of the most controversial issues 
during the negotiation process. It is designed to strengthen the Protocol’s 
environmental integrity, support the carbon market’s credibility and ensure 
transparency of accounting by Parties. Its objective is to facilitate, promote and 
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enforce compliance with the commitments under the Protocol.
154
 Art. 18 of the Kyoto 
Protocol prescribes that:  
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures 
and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative 
list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency 
of non-compliance….  
However, it is just guidance for the compliance. Due to its sensitive nature, the 
content of compliance mechanism has been under much debate and finally the Parties 
of UNFCCC adopted ‘Marrakesh Accords’ for further regulation in July 2002. 
Actually, unlike the WTO, it is difficult for the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol to 
develop a strong legally-binding dispute settlement system for non-compliance 
mainly on the ground that they are under a nature of collective obligations, rather than 
reciprocal ones.
155
 Facilitative approach which Kyoto Protocol has adopted may be 
the best way to achieve its goal, not dispute settlement procedure. 
3.4 The Paris Agreement  
The Paris Agreement and the accompanying COP decision: 
 Reaffirm the goal of limiting global temperature increase well below 2 degrees Celsius, 
while urging efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees; 
 Establish binding commitments by all parties to make “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDCs), and to pursue domestic measures aimed at achieving them; 
                                                 
154
 UNFCCC, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php 
155
 For more discussion, see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law-How 
WTO Relates to Other Rules of International Law 52-88 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003).  
 76 
 Commit all countries to report regularly on their emissions and “progress made in 
implementing and achieving” their NDCs, and to undergo international review; 
 Commit all countries to submit new NDCs every five years, with the clear expectation 
that they will “represent a progression” beyond previous ones; 
 Reaffirm the binding obligations of developed countries under the UNFCCC to support 
the efforts of developing countries, while for the first time encouraging voluntary 
contributions by developing countries too; 
 Extend the current goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in support by 2020 through 
2025, with a new, higher goal to be set for the period after 2025; 
 Extend a mechanism to address “loss and damage” resulting from climate change, which 
explicitly will not “involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation;” 
 Require parties engaging in international emissions trading to avoid “double counting;” 
and 
 Call for a new mechanism, similar to the Clean Development Mechanism under the 
Kyoto Protocol, enabling emission reductions in one country to be counted toward 
another country’s NDC.156 
3.5 Conclusion of the chapter 
The Paris Agreement is the response of contracting parties to the failure of previous 
negotiations. The evolution of the UNFCCC regime seems to go through a paradigm 
shift from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement. It turns to take softer 
approaches to make the system work, mainly the employment of NDCs and the hybrid 
of binding and non-binding provisions in it. However, the incorporation of loss and 
damage is probably not very appropriate because it enlarges the scope of the climate 
issue in the UNFCCC which still needs time to be trusted by all states. In any case, as 
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noted, the Paris Agreement is open for ratification right now. The new approach of the 
Paris Agreement will be examined in political practice soon. 
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Chapter 4 Problems of a Non-Party State’s Participation in 
Global Climate Regime 
 
In this thesis, I distinguish the UNFCCC system with the global climate regime. The 
so-called global climate regime here is larger in scope than the UNFCCC and its 
protocols. As Asselt points out, due to the complexity and uncertainty, this wicked 
problem cannot be governed through a single international regime.
157
 The UNFCCC 
is no doubt the central one among all of them, but other organisations concerning 
climate issues are also important to make the global climate regime complete, such as 
the WTO and other regional or bilateral arrangements.  
States have either moral pressure or legal obligations to make efforts on the GHG 
reduction and adaption. They also have the discretion to choose the way to do it. 
Joining into the UNFCCC regime is not the only and mandatory option in theory. We 
have also seen some countries withdrawing from the second commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol in practice. The absence of some countries in the UNFCCC 
regime has caused some legal and political problems at both international climate 
governance and national climate policy. At the international level, combined with the 
fragmentation of global climate governance, the application of laws between different 
regimes and the management of the interaction of different regimes becomes more 
complicated. At the national level, on the other hand, even a non-party state of the 
UNFCCC regime still has to build up its own national climate system which will 
definitely be affected by and need to interact with the UNFCCC regime. 
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Thus, it is interesting to discuss why a state becomes a non-party state in the 
UNFCCC regime. In addition, in the circumstance that the overlap of different climate 
regimes and the fragmentation of global climate change become inevitable, what is 
the influence of the non-party status to a country in the global climate regime?  
4.1 Causes to become a non-party state in the UNFCCC regime 
4.1.1 Fairness 
As noted above, climate change is a global problem which has affected all human 
beings, whatever the rich or the poor, current or future generations. We definitely need 
global action to deal with it as the global temperature cannot be cooled down by the 
efforts of any single country. Therefore, the next task is how to allocate the burden of 
GHG reduction. The CBDR principle is employed to argue that all countries have 
common responsibilities to combat climate change but every state should bear 
different share of burden by which it is substantially fair to all countries. The general 
meaning is clear while the contents need to be discussed further. 
Fairness or equity is a perennial issue in the history of human society. Human 
beings tend to pursue justice, fairness or equity in their communities. The general idea 
is that things alike should be treated likely. It is also true in international law, as Ian 
Brownlie argues, ‘the sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic 
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting 
primarily of states having a uniform legal personality.’158 Traditionally, a sovereign 
state has the exclusive jurisdiction to its own territory and people, and should not be 
bound to the obligations of any treaty without its consent. Formal equality is easy to 
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be understood and accepted in this regard which posits that ‘all subjects of the law 
should be treated in a similar fashion. Rules are usually deemed to be just if they 
apply to all without discrimination.’159 Formal equality is applied to international law 
as a very fundamental principle. For example, Art. 2.1 of Charter of the United 
Nations provides that ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.’ Also, Art. 18.1 of the Charter of the UN stipulates that 
‘Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.’ Every vote is equal in 
principle except the veto right offered to the five countries in the Security Council.  
Different Treatment however, as Rajamani argues, might be a derogation of the 
doctrine of sovereign equality of states.
160
 The so-called equality of states here is 
surely rooted in formal equality. It argues that formal equality should be adjusted so 
that it can achieve the equal outcomes. Differential treatment could be used to both 
developed and developing countries, but the thesis focuses mainly on those in favour 
of developing countries. There must be some reasons and rationales that justify the 
different treatment from one country to another. It could theoretically stem from 
logics, natural justice, morality, and much more. As Cullet argues, different treatment 
is already a common feature in international environmental law,
161
 and the issue of 
fairness or differential treatment has been discussed in a number of publications in 
international law, international environmental law and climate change law.
162
 Despite 
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of this, referring to the legal regime of international climate change, the stagnation of 
current international negotiations makes it worthy to rethink the theory and practice of 
differential treatment. Countries standing on opposite positions both use the CBDR 
principle to justify their own arguments that the other side of countries should bear 
more burden than they are willing to commit. It would be ironic instead if the CBDR 
principle becomes a tool to block the negotiation. On the other hand, equity or 
fairness should be a dynamic concept which will be re-interpreted or supplemented 
when the basis of theory and practice is continuingly changing in our era, especially 
the challenge to the traditional classification of countries on the level of development. 
4.1.2 Regime design 
There is tension between two objectives pursued by states when they enter into an 
agreement. The first is the desire to make the agreement credible and binding. The 
design elements of hard law, dispute resolution, and monitoring all promote this goal. 
The second part of the explanation is related to the sanctions triggered by the violation 
of an international agreement. A multilateral treaty is often at stuck on the balance of 
the two concerns. In the field of climate change, the evolution of the UNFCCC and its 
protocols clearly illustrates the struggle of choice between them. More interestingly, 
the Paris Agreement now takes a different approach to make the UNFCCC regime 
more workable, which is relatively new from the existing literature.  
4.1.3 Political intervention 
Taiwan’s case is the example that a country cannot become a member in the United 
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Nations system by political intervention. It has been discussed in chapter 2. 
4.2 The relationship and legal effect of a third party to a treaty 
The relationship and legal effect of a third party to a treaty is basically clear in law of 
treaties. It is defined by a general formula, pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (i.e. a 
treaty binds the parties and only the parties). This principle, as Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
points out, has been confirmed in a large number of cases before the World Court, and 
‘has been recognised in state’s practice as fundamental, and its existence had never 
been questioned.’163 Articles 34 to 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) have also stipulated the rules. Article 34 of the VCLT set up the basic 
rule, providing that: ‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
state without its consent.’ Although the fundamental rule is clear, what the more 
significant is the exceptions to the Articles 34 of the VCLT in which non-party states 
are likely to be legally bound by some rules in the treaty, such as the co-existence of a 
rule in a treaty and in customary principle of international law, and the to the issue of 
"erga omnes" obligations.  
4.2.1 Consent of the third party  
It is the principle that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent. The existing literatures have numerous studies on the theory 
and judicial practices of it in international law; however, a unique case occurs 
regarding to the UNFCCC regime is not yet well discussed. Taiwanese government 
has claimed to voluntarily comply with the norms of the UNFCCC regime since 
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1992.
164
 What can be discussed is that: does the unilateral declaration of Taiwanese 
government constitute ‘consent of a third party’? This question is not much discussed 
in English literature and even very rarely in Chinese literature in Taiwan. Professor 
Wen-chen Shih is among the few people to discuss it. She analyses the statement of 
‘voluntary compliance’ from the perspective of legal effect of unilateral declaration in 
international law. She invoked the decision of Nuclear Test (Australia v. France) of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1974 and the discussion in the meeting of 
International Law Commission (ILC) and concludes that under certain conditions, the 
unilateral declaration of states to voluntarily comply with international treaties is 
likely to bring about an obligation to the declaring state.
165
 This case deserves to be 
examined further. 
4.2.2 "Erga omnes" obligations 
"Erga omnes" obligations refers to legal obligations which is owed to the whole 
international community of states and can be enforced by or on behalf of that 
community. An interesting question regarding to the UNFCCC is that: does the 
common concern of humankind on climate change can be seen as an "erga omnes" 
obligation? 
It is already mentioned in chapter 2 that the Draft to the Convent on Environment 
and Development (1995) states that "The concept of ‘common concern’ is not new 
and has been applied in other fields. It forms the basis for international laws relating 
to human rights, humanitarian relief and international labour relations. Those 
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obligations are now recognised as obligations erga omnes, owed by all States to the 
entire international community.
166
  
The dissenting judgement of Judge Weeramantry in the Gabčíkovo – Nagymaros 
Case also regards sustainable development as an erga omnes obligation.
167
 However, 
as Birnie et al. argues, if this kind of arguments is correct, the real characteristic is " 
not that all states have standing before the ICJ in the event of breach, but that the 
international community can hold individual states accountable for compliance with 
their obligations through institutions such as the Conference of the Parties to the 
Climate Change Convention or other comparable bodies endowed, whether by treaty 
or General Assembly resolution, with supervisory power."
168
  
What is interesting to further explore is that is there any rule set forth in the 
UNFCCC constituting an erga omnes obligation? The CBDR principle is the possible 
one which needs to be examined. 
4.2.3 Co-existence of a rule in a treaty and in customary principle of 
international law 
A treaty is different from a customary international law. However, in some special 
circumstance, a rule set forth in a treaty may be binging to a third State as a customary 
rule of international law. Article 38 of the VCLT states that:  
Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as 
such. 
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The relationship between treaty and customs is close. As Philippe Sands points out, "a 
treaty might codify or further develop a rule of customary law" or alternatively "the 
conclusion and implementation of a treaty may reflect the existence of a rule of 
customary law.
169
 
In the case of climate change, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities articulated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC seems to have the potential to 
become a customary law in the future. Therefore, rationally speaking, a non-party in 
the UNFCCC does not want this to happen. It needs to be further discussed. 
4.3 The legal problems of the overlap of climate issues in global 
climate regime to a non-party state in the UNFCCC system 
4.3.1 Conflict of norms  
Conflict of norms is not new in the field of international law, especially between trade 
and environment. What intriguing is how the issue will be dealt with between the 
UNFCCC and the WTO.  
In the UNFCCC system, developed countries have to take domestic measures to 
fulfil their obligations under the Convention and its protocols. Some of the domestic 
measures are likely to constitute trade-restricted measures. For instance, the European 
Union amended its Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) therein all flights falling 
within the aviation activities which depart from an aerodrome situated in the territory 
of a Member State and those which arrive in such an aerodrome from a third country 
will be required to own emission allowances since 2012.
170
 According to the EU-ETS 
on Aviation, airway companies could get some free allowances from EU; get 
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allowances qualified by EU from their own countries; or buy qualified emission 
credits from international carbon market. The excess emissions penalty shall be EUR 
100 for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted for which the operator or 
aircraft operator has not surrendered allowances at a certain date.
171
 Moreover, in the 
event that an aircraft operator fails to comply with the requirements of this Directive 
and where other enforcement measures have failed to ensure compliance, its 
administering Member State may request the Commission to decide on the imposition 
of an operating ban on the aircraft operator concerned.
172
 
 
Although the policy of EU-ETS on Aviation was cancelled later, it is a good case to 
the legal study of conflict of norms. For example, does the UNFCCC system create a 
specific trade obligation to its member states? Does the measure of the EU constitute 
extraterritorial jurisdiction? How to avoid the use of unilateral trade measures? 
4.3.2 The UNFCCC 
Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC asks the Parties should not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade when the measures are taken to combat climate change, including unilateral 
ones. Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol asks the Parties included in Annex I shall 
strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to 
minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on 
international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties 
(emphasis added). However, it is very interesting to note that the term ‘trade’ is not 
mentioned at all in the Paris Agreement. Is it a new idea to avoid the possible conflict 
of norms between the UNFCCC and the WTO? 
4.3.3 The WTO 
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There are plenty of cases about the conflict of norms between international trade and 
environment in the WTO. However, no climate issue is decided under the Article XX 
of the GATT 1994 so far. Given the fact that many countries are introducing more and 
more market-oriented and trade-related domestic measures to fight against climate 
change, the issue should also be discussed on the side of the WTO. 
4.4 Concluding remark 
Conflict of norms is inevitable when climate issues are addressed by different treaties. 
From the perspective of a non-party state, when a trade-restricted measure is imposed 
by a member of the UNFCCC, the non-party state has no choice but to bring it to any 
other platform in which the issue can be addressed, mainly the WTO now. In such a 
case, the disputes are supposed to increase. Harmonisation of different regime is 
needed. It could be done through dialogue between two organisations or 
self-restriction of states’ behaviour. Silence of the contexts of the Paris Agreement on 
trade seems to be a way of harmonisation. 
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Chapter 5 Shaping the National Climate Policies and Laws 
in Taiwan  
 
5.1 Science of climate change in Taiwan 
Climate change is an environmental problem. Taiwan, like other countries on Earth, is 
also facing the challenge and threat of global warming. Taiwanese government has 
done research on the science of climate change in Taiwan for many years.
173
 The 
purpose of environmental policy and law is to resolve environmental problem. 
Therefore, before Taiwanese climate change policy and law are analysed, some 
scientific findings of climate change in Taiwan should be introduced in the first place. 
5.1.1 Change of natural environment due to global warming 
A. Taiwan's warming rate is higher than the global one 
Taiwan’s warming rate was determined using results from the Taiwan Climate Change 
Projection and Information Platform (TCCIP) project. Data collected for over a 
century from Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Hengchun, Taitung, and Hualien 
meteorological stations show that the annual mean temperature in Taiwan increased 
by 1.4°C between 1911 and 2009. This is equal to an increase of 0.14°C per decade, 
which is higher than the global warming rate of 0.07°C per decade. In the last 30 
years (1980 to 2009), the warming rate in Taiwan has accelerated significantly at a 
rate of 0.29°C per decade. This is almost twice the rate of the last century.
174
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B. The rise of sea level is higher than global trend 
An analysis of tidal gauge observations of Taiwan’s coastal regions shows that, from 
1993 to 2003, the sea level in basins close to Taiwan rose at a rate of 5.7 mm yr-1. 
This is twice the rate in the last 50 years and is slightly higher than the 5.3 mm 
yr-1calculated using satellite observations. This rate is substantially higher than the 
global average of 3.1 mm yr-1 calculated by IPCC AR4.
175
 
C. Extreme weather has increased in Taiwan  
Taiwan has been under the threat of natural disasters, such as typhoons, heavy rainfall, 
drought, heat waves, and cold surges. As shown in the report of the National Science 
Council, the proportion of typhoons reaching strong typhoon intensity increased 
significantly after 1980.
176
  
Also, the report of the National Science Council shows an analysis of the average 
number of annual rain days with different precipitation intensities. The data shows 
that the number of torrential rain days (daily rainfall ≧ 200 mm) in Taiwan has 
increased significantly in the last 50 years and the last 30 years, respectively, with 
50-60-year multidecadal variability. The number of light rain days (daily rainfall < 1 
mm) in Taiwan has decreased substantially, with a decreasing trend of 2 days per 
decade in the last 100 years and 4 days per decade in the last 30 years.
177
  
As to hot wave and cold streams, the report of the National Science Council points 
out that the number of days with high temperatures has shown an increasing trend at 
all six stations in the last 100 years. Compared to the 1911-1920 decade, the annual 
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number of days with high temperatures increased by more than 10 days on average 
between 2000 and 2009. Extremely cold events at all six stations have decreased in 
the last 100 years. Both the frequency and intensity of cold surges have decreased 
from the effects of warming.
178
  
According the report of global risk analysis of the World Bank in 2005, Taiwan was 
regarded as one of the most vulnerable country in the world for its high exposure to 
multiple hazards, relatively high mortality risk from multiple hazards, risk from 
earthquakes, landslides,
 
r
elatively 
h
igh economic 
ri
sk from multiple hazards
, and risk from flood.
179
 
The outcome generally shows the similar trend as Taiwanese scientific research 
shows. 
To sum up, it is fair to say Taiwan is vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
From the perspective of protection of nationals' lives and sustainable development, 
Taiwan has the same incentive to fight against climate change. 
5.1.2 Carbon emissions of Taiwan  
The carbon emissions of Taiwan have very high positive co-relation with its economic 
development. As shown in Table 5-1, the GDP per capita of Taiwan has increased 
rapidly from 1970s to 1980s and gradually reached 20,386 US dollars in 2012. At the 
same time, carbon emissions in Taiwan have also surged very sharply in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and continued to rise rapidly in the last two decades along with the rise of 
GDP. According to the data released by the International Energy Agency (see Table 
5-2), the CO2 emissions per capita in Taiwan reached 11.66 kg in 2012, which was 
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even higher than Japan, South Korea and the average of amount in OECD countries. It 
constitutes of around 1% of CO2 emissions in the world. Admitted to say, the current 
CO2 emissions in Taiwan is really high on both the aggregate volume and average per 
person. The energy intensity is also high.  
Therefore, Taiwan is environmentally vulnerable on one hand and has high CO2 
emissions and energy intensity on the other hand. In such a case, Taiwan has the each 
and every motivation and demand to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gas for the 
sakes of national security, sustainable development, international reputation, and trade 
and commercial interests in international markets.  
 92 
Table 5-1 Statistics of Taiwan’s GDP and CO2 emissions by year 
Year 
GDP per capita 
(USD)* 
CO2 emission, 
sectoral approach 
(thousand 
tonnes)** 
CO2 emission 
per capita 
(tonnes / CO2/P) 
CO2 emission 
intensity (kg 
CO2/USD) 
1951 158 N/A N/A N/A 
1960 164 N/A N/A N/A 
1970 393 N/A N/A N/A 
1971 447 31,000*** N/A N/A 
1980 2,385 72,900*** N/A N/A 
1985 3,290 71,400*** N/A N/A 
1990 8,124 109,491 5.4 0.0206 
1991 9,016 118,414 5.8 0.0206 
1992 10,625 126,056 6.1 0.0204 
1993 11,079 135,212 6.5 0.0205 
1994 11,982 142,982 6.8 0.0202 
1995 12,918 150,437 7.1 0.0200 
1996 13,428 158,104 7.4 0.0199 
1997 13,810 170,958 7.9 0.0203 
1998 12,598 181,294 8.3 0.0209 
1999 13,585 190,260 8.7 0.0207 
2000 14,704 209,364 9.5 0.0215 
2001 13,147 213,039 9.6 0.0223 
2002 13,404 221,104 9.9 0.0219 
2003 13,773 230,706 10.3 0.0221 
2004 15,012 238,540 10.6 0.0215 
2005 16,051 245,233 10.8 0.0211 
2006 16,491 252,097 11.1 0.0206 
2007 17,154 252,927 11.2 0.0197 
2008 17,399 244,688 10.7 0.0187 
2009 16,359 232,244 10.1 0.0181 
2010 18,503 248,331 10.8 0.0175 
2011 20,006 253,510 11.0 0.0171 
2012 20,386 248,702 10.7 0.0166 
Average rate of growth 
1990-2012 
3.80 3.17 -0.98 
Average rate of growth 
2000-2012 
1.45 1.06 -2.14 
Note: * quoted and translated by the author from National Statistics, R.O.C.(Taiwan), Summary 
of National Income Statistics, available at: 
http://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=28862&ctNode=3565 
    ** quoted and translated by the author from Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, R.O.C. (Taiwan), Statistics of CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion of Taiwan 8 
(July 2013). The data calculates CO2 emissions only, other GHG are not included. 
    *** International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2012 – Highlights, 
available at: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,4010,en.html 
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Table 5-2 Comparison of Taiwan’s CO2 emissions with major countries and the 
world* 
 
Taiwan Ranking World OECD Japan Korea USA China 
Aggregate 
emissions 
a
 
(million 
tonne CO2) 
270.22 20 30,326 12,440 1,143.07 563.08 5,368.63 7,269.85 
Population 
(million) 
23.18 49 6,825 1,232 127.38 48.88 310.11 1,338.30 
CO2 
emission 
per capita 
(million 
tonne) 
11.66 19 4.44 10.10 8.97 11.52 17.31 5.43 
Emission 
Intensity 
b
 
(kg 
CO2/USD) 
0.36 54 0.44 0.34 0.29 0.43 0.41 0.80 
Notes: *This table is translated by the author from EPA, GHG emission statistics, available at: 
http://www.epa.gov.tw/ch/artshow.aspx?busin=12379&art=2009011715443552&path=124
37 (last visited on 1 September 2013) 
       a. CO2 emissions from international navigation are NOT included.  
       b. Calculated by purchase power parity and USD in 2005. 
Sources: International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics, 2012 edi tion. 
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5.2 Historic background of policy making 
Although Taiwan is not a member of the UNFCCC, Taiwan has paid attention on the 
climate change issue since early 1990s. Basically, it could be argued that to a large 
extent the climate change policy of Taiwan followed mainly the development of 
international climate change negotiations. 
A. 1992-2000 
The work of policy making on climate change officially started in 1992. The year 
1992 was a significant year in the history of international environmental law, since 
many environmental issues were turned from scientific research into political 
commitment when the Rio Conference was held and several important MEAs was 
signed in the conference, including the UNFCCC. During the time of the Rio 
Conference, as mentioned in chapter 2, the then President of the ROC, Lee, Teng-hui, 
announced to the world that Taiwan, as a member in the global village, is willing to 
voluntarily comply with the norms of the UNFCCC though Taiwan is not a 
contracting party of it. In May 1992, the cross-cutting Working Panel on Global 
Environmental Change was established under the Executive Yuan to generally cope 
with international environmental affairs. After the Rio Conference, the Working Panel 
was upgraded to the title of Guiding Panel on Global Environmental Change, with a 
sub-working panel on the work of UNFCCC. 
In 1997, following the signature of the Kyoto Protocol and the widely-accepted 
concern of sustainable development, Taiwan established the Committee on National 
Sustainable Development of the Executive Yuan to replace the old working panel. At 
that time, environmental issues, including the climate change issue, had gradually 
been incorporated into the field of sustainable development. However, it was not a 
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official governmental agency until the promulgation of the Basic Environmental Act 
in 2002, by which the legal status of the National Sustainable Development was 
formally confirmed.
180
 
Climate change issue is highly linked with national energy supply and security. In 
1998, the first National Energy Conference was held in order to respond to the global 
trend of carbon emissions mitigation after the signature of the Kyoto Protocol.
181
 It 
was held by the Ministry of Economic Affairs attended by varied interests groups and 
civil society. It concluded that Taiwan should insist "no regret" policy and reduce its 
CO2 emission to the level of 2000 by 2020, or 10 tonnes per capita per year. It was the 
first time the timetable and target of carbon reduction was proposed to the public. 
Also, Taiwan should seek to the support of other countries to define Taiwan as a 
newly industrialized country and make its own National Communication under the 
UNFCCC. In addition, many suggestions on energy policies and the adjustment of 
energy structure were made, including the nuclear energy.
182
 
Actually, the conclusions of the National Energy Conference do not legally bind the 
Taiwanese government. The suggested target and timetable of the reduction of CO2 
emissions were also controversial between industrial groups and environmental 
groups. For example, industrial groups argued that Taiwan is not a contracting of the 
Kyoto Protocol, there is no reason for Taiwan to strictly abide the norms of the Kyoto 
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Protocol; rather, voluntary carbon reduction by industries is the right way to go.
183
 
There was no clear and unequivocal conclusion on it in the conference. However, it is 
very clear from the conclusions that Taiwan has adopted the so-called voluntary 
compliance approach to cope with international climate affairs, as mentioned in 
chapter 2. Two National Communication reports were made in 2002 and 2012 
respectively. 
B. 2000-2008 
In 2000, the DPP won the presidential election, stepping up to replace the KMT. DPP 
proposed nuclear-free homeland policy and attempted to stop establishing the fourth 
nuclear power station in Taiwan. It was challenged by the KMT, the leading party in 
the parliament.
184
 It was a political and constitutional crisis in Taiwan. As a 
compromise, the proposal to stop establishing the fourth nuclear power station was 
cancelled while the Basic Environmental Act was passed in 2002. The nuclear-free 
homeland policy was incorporated in the Article 23 of the Act, stating that:  
The government shall establish plans to gradually achieve the goal of becoming a 
nuclear-free country. The government shall also strengthen nuclear safety 
management and control, protections against radiation, and the management of 
radioactive materials and monitoring of environmental radiation to safeguard the 
public from the dangers of radiation exposure. 
In such political atmosphere and the enter into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Addressing Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol Working Group was established and 
the second National Energy Conference was also held in 2005. The second National 
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Energy Conference focused more on the nuclear issue than carbon reduction.
185
 The 
target of carbon reduction was suggested to be lower than that in the first National 
Energy Conference because of its low feasibility.
186
 Sectors of energy, industry, 
transportation and residence were suggested to cut their carbon emissions. In addition, 
many measures were also proposed to implement the reduction of carbon emissions, 
such as improvement of energy efficiency and conservation, the use of renewable 
energy, acceleration of the development of low-carbon technology, and the adjustment 
of electricity price.
187
 In particular, companies in industrial sector were encouraged to 
sign "voluntary carbon reduction arrangements" with government.
188
 Companies 
which sign the arrangement and actually reduce their carbon emissions can get the 
off-set credits in return. The credits have been involved in the emission trading system 
by the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act since July 2015. However, to 
sum up, there was no consensus reached between industrial and environmental groups 
in the second National Energy Conference.
189
 Some controversial issues were left to 
the conferences thereafter, such as the National Sustainable Development and the 
Conference on Sustainable Development of Taiwan's Economy in 2006.  
The discussion in the National Energy Conference showed an important and clear 
signal to the linkage of Taiwan's national climate policy with the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Conference was divided into six discussion groups, and four of the them directly 
referred to the issue that how Taiwan should make its complete climate policy and the 
strategies on the reduction of CO2 emissions in industrial, transportation and 
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residential and commercial sectors, with a view to responding to the enter into force 
of the Kyoto Protocol.
190
 For example, the conclusion suggested Taiwan follow the 
model of the Kyoto Protocol to set up its target and timetable of carbon reduction and. 
Cost-effective approach and the CBDR principle were also incorporated in the 
conclusion.
191
 Again, though the conclusion of the Conference did not legally bind 
the government, it showed the position clearly that Taiwan determined to voluntarily 
harmonise its national climate policy to international climate norms.  
C. 2008 to present 
In 2008, the KMT won the presidential election. Also, it was the first year for the 
Annex 1 countries to implement the reduction of CO2 emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol. In Taiwan, a new Working Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation 
and Carbon Reduction was established under the Committee of National Sustainable 
Development and the Sustainable Energy Policy Framework was announced by the 
KMT government in June 2008. The Framework aims to achieve the "win-win-win" 
outcome among energy, environmental protection and economy.
192
 It prescribes that 
the target of this policy is to raise energy efficiency, develop clean energy and ensure 
the stable supply of energy. Inter alia, energy efficiency should be raised at least 2% 
per year in the coming eight years; energy intensity should be reduced at least 20% of 
the level of 2005 by 2015, and 50% by 2050 by technological innovation and 
integrated measures. CO2 emissions should be reduced to the level of 2008 by 2016 to 
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2020, and to the level of 2000 by 2025. The rate of use of low-carbon energy should 
be increased from 40% to 55% in the power generation system by 2025. Finally, it 
also aims to establish a safe energy supply system which can meet the need of 6% of 
economic growth and 30000 USD of national income per capita per year in the 
coming four years.
193
 
Further, among all the contents in the Framework, the proposal to construct a 
complete legal system on climate change may be the most important issue for this 
thesis. The system includes the legislation of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act, the 
Renewable Energy Development Act, Energy Tax Act and the amendment of Energy 
Management Act. The "four energy acts" reveal the different policy instruments 
employed by Taiwanese government to combat climate change, including command 
and control, subsidy, and internalization of external cost (tax), and cap and trade 
regime.
194
 To date, three of them are already passed and enacted except that the 
Energy Tax Act is still under review in the Parliament.     
In 2009, as noted earlier in chapter 2, the KMT government formally promote 
Taiwan's bid to "meaningfully participate in the UNFCCC". Also, the third National 
Energy Conference was held in April 2009 to continue the discussion of the 
controversial energy policy of Taiwan. Briefly speaking, the conclusion of the 2009 
National Energy Conference reaffirmed the Taiwanese society has the strong will to 
make Taiwan a low-carbon society. The target and timetable of the reduction of GHG 
were again fiercely debated by different groups in the meeting. Also, it was suggested 
that the four energy acts and the Basic Energy Development Act should be passed as 
soon as possible to construct a legal system for the work of mitigation and adaptation. 
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In addition, it was also suggested that Taiwan should seek to cooperate with other 
countries and participate more in the international energy organisations. 
195
    
In 2012, the 2012 National Climate Change Summit was held by the EPA of 
Taiwan in Taipei. Interestingly, no conclusion was made in the meeting. Instead, the 
participation of civil society and the right to be heard was the main melody of the 
meeting. The Summit focused on the communication among government, industries, 
varied groups of the civil society and the public. Different views, ranging from the 
perspective of climate science, agriculture and biodiversity, water pricing, economy, 
energy, climate diplomacy, environmental education and so on were presented.
196
 
Maybe it is because that Taiwanese people realised that Taiwan had been struck in the 
middle on the making of national development policy in the last twenty years, even 
though government had convened many national conferences in the past. The lack of 
mutual understanding among different interest groups needs to be resolved before the 
legislation. The bottom-up approach was used in the meeting and seemed to be 
successful.
197
  
2015 was an important year for the development of Taiwan's climate policy. Firstly, 
the fourth National Energy Conference was held in January 2015. Nuclear energy 
issue was still the main focus of debate in the meeting, which seriously affected the 
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making of conclusion of the Conference.
198
 
Secondly, the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act was passed in 15 
June 2015. The Act is seen as the most important law for climate change in Taiwan. 
One of the key points that the Act could be passed is because the Chinese National 
Federation of Industries, the leader of the industrial sector in Taiwan, changed its 
position and turned to support the Act. In the past, the Chinese National Federation of 
Industries was seen as the key person to block the Act because it will increase the 
economic cost of industries. Also, Taiwan is not a member of the UNFCCC, Taiwan 
does not need to be a front runner. The core problem is the target and timetable. 
However, the industrial sector has gradually realised that carbon reduction is the 
international trend. If Taiwan does not follow the international norms, the export of 
Taiwanese products will be adversely affected.
199
 The Act set up a clear target and 
timetable. It is that long-term national GHG emission reduction goal shall be to 
reduce GHG emissions to no more than 50% of 2005 GHG emission by 2050.
200
 
More details of the Act will be discussed later. 
Thirdly, Taiwanese government proclaimed voluntarily its own INDCs on 17 
September 2015. As shown in the document, "In response to the Lima Call for 
Climate Action, Taiwan is committed to communicating its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC)...."
201
 In the statement, Taiwan committed to 
                                                 
198
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implement an economy-wide target, through domestic abatement effort to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions (214 Mt CO2-eq) by 50% from the business-as-usual level 
(428 Mt CO2-eq) by 2030.
202
 This shows again Taiwan's ambitious commitment in 
combating climate change. Further, because the emission target is incorporated in the 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act, it is not just a policy announcement 
but also a legal obligation in national law. 
D. Sub-conclusion  
More than twenty years has passed since former President Lee's announcement to 
voluntarily comply with the norms of the UNFCCC in 1992. Taiwanese government 
has made great efforts to construct its climate policy. Several things could be observed 
through the development of the climate policy. Firstly, it has been constantly proved 
by the announcement of policy or legislation that Taiwan commits itself to voluntarily 
comply with the norms in the international climate change regime. Taiwan treats itself 
as if it is a member of the UNFCCC. Secondly, the dilemma between economic 
development and environmental protection has existed in Taiwan since the end of the 
World War II.
203
 As Lin argues, "environmental pragmatist discourse coalition" and 
"climate action discourse coalition" in Taiwan have different positions on the 
environmental issues, such as the ideology of growth, the value of environment, and 
approaches to protect ecosystem.
204
 The long-standing deadlock of the national 
negotiation proves the phenomenon. In Taiwan, climate policy is highly intertwined 
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with national energy policy, in particular the target of the reduction of CO2 emission. 
It becomes more controversial when the issue of the fourth nuclear power station is 
considered together. The aim of climate policy seems to be lean to supporting the 
stable and diverse energy supply in order to maintain the economic growth of Taiwan 
more than responding to the concern of environment as such. Economic concerns 
draw more attention than environmental concerns. 
5.3 Climate legislation in Taiwan  
5.3.1 Domestic laws relating to climate change 
As noted earlier, Taiwan is producing more and more greenhouse gases. Therefore, 
Taiwanese government accelerates to establish the legal structures for the mitigation 
of climate change in recent years. Taiwan's response to the GHG reduction at national 
level could be seen from many aspects. This part of discussion emphasizes on its 
current domestic legal constructions. 
A. Constitution 
The notion of ‘environmental protection’ was not incorporated into the Constitution of 
ROC, which was adopted on 25 December 1947. Following the international tendency, 
however, environmental protection has become the fundamental policy at 
Constitutional level since the Amendment of the Constitution in 1991. Article 10.2 of 
the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the R.O.C. (Taiwan) provides that: 
‘Environmental and ecological protection shall be given equal consideration with 
economic and technological development.’  
The issue of climate change, of course, should be involved at Constitutional level 
as well. 
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B.  Basic Environmental Act 
Basic Environmental Act was promulgated by presidential order on December 11, 
2002. The Act aims to 'raise the quality of the environment, advance the health and 
well-being of the public, preserve environmental resources, and pursue sustainable 
development by promoting environmental protection.'
205
  
The provisions which relate to GHG reduction are as follows: 
Article 3 stipulates that:  
Economic, technological and social development shall equally emphasize 
environmental protection based on long-term national interests. However, in the 
event that economic, technological or social development has a seriously 
negative impact on the environment or there is concern of endangering the 
environment, the protection of the environment shall prevail. 
Article 21 stipulates that: ‘Government entities at all levels shall actively adopt 
measures to control carbon dioxide emissions and establish related plans to mitigate 
the greenhouse effect.’ 
Article 37 stipulates that:  
With the aim of rationally and effectively using resources and meeting 
environmental protection needs, government entities at all levels shall adopt 
appropriate preferential treatment, incentive, guidance and reparation measures 
for the following activities: 
 Protection of the natural, social and human environment; 
 Research and development of clean production technologies, equipment or 
products for production cleaning; 
 Research and development of resource recycling and reuse technologies 
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 Promotion and application of renewable energy; 
 Research and development of energy conservation technology and installation of 
products that conserve energy; 
 Manufacture or installation of pollution control equipment; 
 Moving for the purpose of protecting the environment; 
 Provision of land or other resources to be used to protect the environment; 
 Environmental reforestation and greenification; 
 Other activities related to environmental protection. 
 C. Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act 
The Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act is seen as the most important 
legislation for Taiwan to cope with climate change in the future. As mentioned, the 
Act was passed in 15 June 2015. Key provisions of this Act relating the linkage to the 
UNFCCC are as follows:  
1. Long-term target of GHG reduction 
As noted above, the Act set up a long-term national GHG emission reduction goal , by 
which Taiwan commits to reduce GHG emissions to no more than 50% of 2005 GHG 
emission by 2050.
206
 The goal shall be timely adjusted by the central competent 
authority, in consultation with the central industry competent authorities, by taking 
into consideration the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), its agreements and or related international conventions decisions, 
together with domestic circumstances, subject to the Executive Yuan’s approval; and 
in line with the required periodical review. 
                                                 
206
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2. Main principles 
The Act set up some principles in Article 6. First, the National reduction targets and 
schedule shall seek to realize the common but differentiated responsibilities 
specified in UNFCCC, while also furthering the sustainable development of the 
nation’s environment, economy, and society; 207  second, the determination of 
sector-based periodic regulatory goals shall take cost effectiveness into consideration, 
and strive to achieve GHG reductions at the lowest possible cost;
208
third, the 
government shall actively adopt preventive measures, seek to forecast, avoid, or 
reduce the causes of climate change, and mitigate the adverse effects of climate 
change;
209
 fourth, the government shall actively strengthen international 
cooperation, and strive to maintain the international competitiveness of domestic 
industries.
210
(emphasis added) 
It could be seen from the emphasized words that the Act aims to connect seamlessly 
with the UNFCCC by internalizing the principles of the UNFCCC. 
3. Public participation 
Public participation is stipulated in Article 8 of the Act which asks the Executive Yuan 
‘to invite relevant central government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
experts and scholars to determine and review the division, integration, implementation 
and compilation of the work of GHG reduction and climate change adaptation.’ 
4. Fossil fuel tax 
Fossil fuel will be taxed in the future. Article 5.3(3) asks the government to 
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208
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implement tax mechanisms on imported fossil fuels based on carbon dioxide 
equivalent, in order to respond to the impact of climate change, under the principle of 
equality and social welfare promotion. 
5. Cap and trade mechanism 
A cap-and-trade mechanism is committed to be established in the future according to 
Article 8.2(12) of the Act. In order to make it work, Taiwan needs to create a national 
system for measurement, registry and verification (MRV). The problem is that when 
emission credits or allowances are made by the system, can it be accepted by other 
countries? This is the biggest question for Taiwan to overcome in the future. 
  D. Statute for Upgrading Industries 
Statute for Upgrading Industries is the law which mainly relates to industrial 
development. Article 6.1(4) of this Statute provides that: ‘To meet the requirement for 
industrial upgrading, a company may credit five to twenty percent of the amount of 
funds disbursed for any of the following purposes against the amount of 
profit-seeking enterprise income tax payable in each year within a period of five years 
from the then current year: …The funds invested in equipment or technology used for 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or the enhancement of energy efficiency;’ 
(emphasis added) This approach echoes Article 2.1(a)(v) of Kyoto Protocol, which 
suggests parties impose progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, 
fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas 
emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of 
market instruments. By the same token, it is basically good to impose this kind of 
measures, but the potential conflict with WTO norms should also be considered as 
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well.  
  E. Draft on Energy Tax Act 
This Draft was submitted to the congress in 2006, but it was revoked by Democratic 
Progressive Party in November 2007. As noted before, it is expected that this Energy 
Tax Act could encourage nationals to save energy, to raise the efficiency of the use of 
energy, to push the development of energy industry as well, and then to enhance the 
growth of economy. The polluter-pays principle in international environmental law 
could be the good ground to this Draft. However, this Draft suffers too much 
opposition from the industry groups, so it is not clear how it will develop in the future. 
  F. Renewable Energy Development Act 
This Statute was sent to the congress for consideration on 14 June 2005, chiefly due to 
the entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005. It has been 
postponed for several years and finally it was adopted and then promulgated on 8 July 
2009. Taiwan relies deeply on the import of energy to develop its economy and meet 
the basic need of lives. However, when No-Nuke policy becomes prominent in 
Taiwan after 2000 and fossil fuels are not a good choice, the substitute energy 
becomes more and more important. 
As for the purpose of this Statute, Article 1 of the Statute shows that ‘[T]he main 
goals of this Statute are to promote the use of renewable energy, enhance the diversity 
of energy, improve the quality of environment and boost the development of related 
industries.’ Notably, the main way to achieve these goals in the Statute is through the 
governmental subsidy to the industries. According to Article 6 of the Statute, a power 
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plant should be collected a certain percent of money as a fund when electric power, 
which is not produced by renewable energy, is generated; the purpose of this fund is 
used for the development of renewable energy and for the subsidy of the equipments 
and electric price of renewable energy, and so on. Actually, economic incentives are 
the common way to push the environmental protection and sustainable development 
in Taiwan. As noted above, though this approach may be justified by Article 2.1(a)(v) 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the requirement of National Treatment and other WTO norms 
ought to be concerned. 
  G. Air Pollution Control Act 
Air Pollution Control Act has entered into force for many years in Taiwan. Article 2.(6) 
of the Air Pollution Control Act Enforcement Rules gives the competent authority, i.e. 
Environmental Protection Administration(EPA), discretion to decide what can be 
regarded as an air pollutant. However, it was not until 2012 that the six greenhouse 
gases were declared to be ‘air pollutants’ by the EPA of Taiwan.211 It is a temporary 
stage because on the one hand Taiwan wanted to regulate the emissions of greenhouse 
gas; however, on the other hand due to the fact that the legislation of the Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction and Management Act had been postponed for consideration in the 
congress for several years, Taiwan government had to find a ‘plan B’ to get to its goal. 
In the declaration, the EPA stated the decision on the ground that ‘CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs and SF6, the so-called greenhouse gases which result in the effect of 
global warming and climate change, and indirectly impact, change and hinder the 
living environment.’ To some extent, Taiwan follows the pace of the EPA of the US 
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which declared the greenhouse gas as air pollutants in 2009. It is notably to say that 
because the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act is already promulgated, 
the regulation of the GHG is opted out from this Act.      
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter analyses how Taiwan interacts and reconciles its national climate policies 
and laws with the UNFCCC. First, Taiwan continues to claim that the UNFCCC 
should allow Taiwan to take ‘meaningful participation’ in the meetings of the 
UNFCCC in a more flexible way, such as an ‘observer’ status. Second, Taiwanese 
government has constantly announced its ‘voluntary compliance’ approach to tackle 
the climate issues with the UNFCCC since 1992. Third, Taiwan explicitly 
incorporates the main principles of the UNFCCC into the domestic laws. Fourth, 
Taiwan provides its financial and technological support to assist the use of renewable 
energy to some African countries which have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, such 
as the ‘One child, one light’ programme in Burkina Faso.  
On the other hand, Taiwan pays much attention to the imposition of climate-related 
trade measures in other organisations or countries. The discussion of CO2 reduction in 
the ICAO and the debate on the imposition of carbon allowance to foreign aircrafts in 
the EU-ETS on aviation are the just examples. In such a circumstance, Taiwan 
depends highly on the operation of the WTO to claim its rights on trade.  
In conclusion, Taiwan is the best case to show that the UNFCCC should take 
special consideration to the involvement of an unusual non-party state.  
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Chapter 6 Moving to Wider Participation to the UNFCCC 
Regime 
 
Based on the above studies, chapter 6 turns to discuss what can be learned from the 
latest outcome of the UNFCCC negotiation and rethinks the possible approaches to 
encourage the widest participation of all countries and make the global climate regime 
work better.  
6.1 Multilateralism vs. Minilateralism 
In the period that the negotiations of the UNFCCC were stalled, some scholars argued 
that due to the inherent limitation to make a multilateral climate treaty, it is probably 
not the best choice to insist make a new international legally binding agreement. 
Instead, states can turn to build up bilateral or regional cooperation mechanism which 
makes it easier to put the work forward.
212
 On the other hand, many people still 
believe that an international legal agreement is the best choice. As Bodansky and 
Diringer argue, for a long-term objective, it would be helpful for parties to pursue an 
ultimate, binding framework.
213
 The debate for the future development of the 
UNFCCC to induce wider participation deserves to be discussed. 
6.2 The regime design 
The Kyoto Protocol was criticised to reflect the CBDR principle in the wrong way, 
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which caused the deadlock of the negotiations for a decade. Instead, the Paris 
Agreement takes different approach to tackle the issue. To the large extent, it can be 
called a paradigm shift that the UNFCCC regime is reshaped into a new face.  
6.3 Harmonisation of different climate regimes 
When fragmentation of global climate governance becomes inevitable, the 
harmonisation of different climate regimes is need. How can it be addressed from the 
perspective of international law? 
6.4 Incentives   
As Cullet concludes in the analysis of differential treatment in international 
environmental law, self-interest rather than solidarity is probably the main motives for 
successfully implementing differentiation in practice.
214
 The analysis of this thesis 
also resonate Cullet’s argument. In other words, in the case that self-interest is the 
main concern for states, what incentives can be provided to join the regime? 
6.4 More flexibility of the UNFCCC Regime  
As noted, to the large extent, the adoption of the Paris Agreement can be called a 
paradigm shift that the UNFCCC regime is reshaped into a new face. The key point to 
this is that it makes the regime more flexible for party states to build up their emission 
target and timetable on a voluntary basis combined with some mandatory obligations 
on the reporting and stocktaking. Based on the observation of the development of the 
latest UNFCCC regime, this thesis argues that making the regime move forward is the 
goal at the stage. The widest participation is the necessary means to get to the goal. In 
such a case, the problem of Taiwan’s membership in the UNFCCC could also be 
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considered in this way. The idea of a qualified ‘carbon entity’ may be feasible. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines Taiwan’s participation in the global climate regime from the 
perspective of a non-party state. It consists of theoretical research on non-party issues 
and an empirical study on the case that how Taiwan is affected by its non-party status 
and how it interacts with and integrates itself into the global climate regime. In this 
chapter, I conclude as follows with a general suggestion that the UNFCCC regime 
should be more flexible on membership and continue the hybrid of soft-hard law 
approach to make the regime more effective. 
Climate change is a wicked problem which needs to be governed by multi-level 
actors and also by multi-facet regimes at different fields due to its complexity and 
uncertainty. The UNFCCC system plays the central role in global climate regime 
while it is supplemented by other climate arrangements. In addition, climate change is 
an issue about self-interest of states and solidarity of the international community. In 
such a circumstance, participation of states in global climate regime is actually an 
issue about how the needs of all states are fulfilled and how the regime can really 
move forward to work more effectively.       
Although to encourage the widest participation of all states is the goal of the 
UNFCCC, the preceding history of the negotiations in the UNFCCC shows some 
inherent and fundamental limitation to make a multilateral treaty. Fairness is one of 
the main problems. It is a perennial issue in human society. A multilateral treaty is 
always made under the consensus and compromise of all participating parties when 
each and every state thought it is treated fairly. The preceding analysis of the CBDR 
principle shows that the way that the Kyoto Protocol reflects the CBDR principle does 
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not function very well. Because there are no concrete or quantitative criteria forever to 
measure how the equitable distribution of burden should be. The top-down approach 
of the Kyoto Protocol to ask Annex I countries make concrete commitments while 
keep silent on the obligations of developing countries undervalues the importance of 
self-interest and fairness to states, especially developed countries. The use of NDCs in 
the Paris Agreement is a good way to eliminate the dissatisfaction that states are 
forced by other countries to make commitments.  
The second problem to make a multilateral treaty is the design of the treaty. It is 
also about the self-interest of states. On the one hand, states create the treaty and 
expect it work well; on the other hand, states understand they are bound by it and tend 
to make it not too strict at the same time. The dilemma is fully reflected in the Paris 
Agreement. Although the call ‘to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’ in 
Durban 2011 was fulfilled, Contracting Parties adopted the hybrid of binding and 
non-binding contents in the Paris Agreement. Making the regime work well is more 
important than making a treaty legally binding. As Bodansky and Diringer argue, an 
evolving regime must take careful steps when it is deepening, broadening and 
integrating. It takes time for trust by all participants.
215
The preceding analysis of the 
thesis observes the failure of ambitious Bali Action and Copenhagen conference and 
also sees that the Paris Agreement is on the right track to make itself softer.  
Life will find a way. When the negotiation of the UNFCCC is stalled, states turn to 
find solutions in other platforms. For example, the United States rejected to join the 
Kyoto Protocol while made bilateral joint climate statements with China and India 
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respectively in 2014 and 2015. It also establishes a carbon market of its own. 
Fragmentation of global climate governance becomes inevitable. The analysis of 
chapter 4 shows that even a non-party state of the UNFCCC will be likely de jure and 
definitely be de facto affected by the UNFCCC. The problems of conflicts of norms 
and forum shopping need to be addressed. Self-restriction of legislation seems to be a 
way to avoid the conflict. For instance, unlike the CITES, the Paris Agreement keeps 
silent to the issue of trade. However, it remains to be seen. 
Taiwan’s case in the participation of a non-party state in the UNFCCC is unique. 
Unlike some countries which determine to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan 
is rejected to join the United Nations’ regime by the sovereign problem. The influence 
of the non-party status in the United Nations to Taiwan is undoubtedly enormous. 
First, the previous experience of Taiwan to be imposed trade sanctions by the CITES 
and the United States unilaterally affected deeply the response strategy of Taiwanese 
government for foreign affairs and people’s attitude to international environmental 
norms. People thought Taiwan is not treated fairly by the international community 
because the rights and obligations are not balanced. 
Second, it is very clear to Taiwan that it cannot be isolated outside the international 
community. Therefore, Taiwanese government employs all the possible strategies to 
participate in the international affairs, such as the ‘meaningful participation’ and 
‘voluntary compliance’ approaches, or to participate in the international agreements or 
organisations as a ‘fishing entity’ or an ‘observer’. In the field of climate change, 
Taiwan is using the same strategy and approach.  
Third, since the action to fight against climate change connect highly to the 
development of green technology and Taiwan became a full member of the WTO in 
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2002, Taiwan used to address climate issues in the platforms of economy and trade, 
rather than environment.  
In addition, the empirical case of Taiwan shows that when rejected to join the 
UNFCCC system, it is very difficult for Taiwan to establish a national carbon market 
in a cost-effective way because its carbon market is not able to link with other 
markets in the world. To some extent, Taiwan becomes a loop hole in the global 
climate governance. 
It can be learned from the current development of the UNFCCC that offering more 
flexibility on the issue of access is the way to address the problem of Taiwan’s 
participation in the global climate regime. By softening the legal effect of the Paris 
Agreement and encouraging more participation of non-state actors, contracting parties 
of the Paris Conference seem to have realised that widest participation to make the 
regime work is more important than making a perfect, binding agreement. If this 
observation is correct, then Taiwan can be treated similarly. It does not mean that 
Taiwan must become a member of the UNFCCC, but that Taiwan can be seen as a 
qualified ‘carbon entity’ to link its market to the world. Given the common concern of 
humankind and Taiwan’s nearly 1% of global share in CO2 emission, Taiwan has no 
ground to be forgotten in the global climate regime. 
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